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THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FEDERAL SYSTEMS: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE BENEFITS OF STATE PARTICIPATION
DANIEL HALBERSTAM*

I.

INTRODUCTION

'N recent years, the constitutional law of foreign relations has come
.under intense academic scrutiny, and with it the traditionally accepted
constitutional balance between the federal government and the States.'
In the course of this renewed debate, revisionist scholars have challenged
2
the previously dominant view that States have no place in foreign affairs.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I would like
to thank David Barron, Donald Herzog, Rick Hills, Ellen Katz, Alisa Klein, Richard
Primus, Nigel Purvis, Donald Regan, Peter Spiro, and Edward Swaine for valuable
comments and discussions, and Lumen Mulligan and David Peters for helpful
research assistance. I would also like to thank the University of Michigan Law
School for providing generous research support from the Cook Endowment.
1. See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFJ'A Constitutional?,108
HARv. L. REV. 799 (1995); Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law ?, 70
U. CoLo. L. RE'V. 1089 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, A Ner American Foreign Affairs
Law?]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,97 Mici. L. REv.
390 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Power]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997); Jack L . Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs
Preemption, 2001 Sui,. CT. REv. 175 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs
Preemption];Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1617 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Federal Courts]; David M. Golove,
Treaty Making and the Nation: The HistoricalFoundationsof the NationalistConception of
the Treaty Powe, 98 MicHi. L. REV. 1075 (2000) [hereinafter Golove, Treaty Making];
Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824
(1998); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original
Understandingof Foreign Policy Federalism,75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999); Peter
J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L REV. 1223 (1996) [hereinafter
Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism]; Edward T. Swaine, Crosby as Foreign Relations
Law, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 481 (2001) [hereinafter Swain, Foreign Relations Law]; Edward T. Swaine, NegotiatingFederalism: State Bargainingand the Dormant Treaty Power,
49 DUKE L.J. 1127 (2000) [hereinafter Swain, Negotiating Federalism];Laurence H.
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Intepretation,108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Globalizationand
Federalism in a Post Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000); G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of Foreign Affairs Jurisprudence,70 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1109 (1999);
John C. Yoo, Clobalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REX'. 1955 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 815 (arguing that state courts
may play legitimate role in adjudication of customary international law); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1677 (arguing that absent congressional action broad judicial displacement of state authority in this area is unwarranted both
as matter of constitutional interpretation and institutional competence); Spiro,
Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 1, at 1225 (arguing that exclusion of States
from foreign affairs arena is no longerjustified in post-war era of more discriminating global interactions).

(1015)
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The dominant focus of this revisionist challenge is that state involvement
in foreign affairs is not as hazardous as has previously been assumed.-" For
example, on the revisionist view, foreign states have become more sophisticated in fine-tuning retaliation to affect not the Nation as a whole, but the
responsible subnational unit of government; the end of the Cold War
defused the tinder-box of international relations in which any diplomatic
misstep implied apocalyptic consequences; and the federal political actors
are, in any event, capable of containing adverse state action without the
help of the judiciary. Although there is disagreement about these claims,
the debate thus focuses largely on the existence and mitigation of adverse
4
consequences of States, foreign affairs activities to the Nation as a whole.
Prior commentary suggesting greater openness to States' foreign affairs activities has accordingly argued primarily from the perspective of
state autonomy, by challenging the constitutional warrant for limiting
what wotld otherwise be a legitimate domain of state activity and by reassessing the harm that States may inflict upon the Nation. By contrast,
this Article considers the potential advantages to the Nation of state involvement in foreign affairs. Finding that such advantages exist, it examines how state activities might be harnessed to reap them. Such
considerations will not inform the debate surrounding any state autonomy
interest in foreign affairs, but suggest that even if only national interests
should bear on foreign affairs analysis, certain state involvement might
nonetheless be valuable for the Nation as a whole. 5 And if so, a slightly
3. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1698 (noting that although "threat of fifty different voices" in foreign affairs looms large, there is "little
reason to think that state control over matters not governed by enacted federal law
affects U.S. foreign relations in a way that warrants preemption"); see also id. (stating that federal political branches "are quite capable of identifying and responding
to any adverse consequences of this behavior").
4. See, e.g., Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 1, at 1253 (challenging
Goldsmith's assumption that federal political branches are able to control States'
harmful behavior); id. at 1259-61 (arguing instead that harm is minimized today
because foreign nations recognize States as "demi-sovereigns" and are likely to target retaliation not at U.S. at large, but against offending State in particular);
Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1, at 1254 (noting difficulty of assessing
whether federal government is able to contain dangers of state involvement).
Scholars have made reference to the potential benefits of state involvement only in
passing. See, e.g., Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, supra note 1, at 1099;
Goldsmith, Statutoy Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 1, at 190-91. Even these
authors do not focus on the national benefits as a means to evaliate the States'
participation in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Statutoiy Foreign Affairs Preemption, supro note 1, at 177 ("Should preemption analysis indulge a presumption in
favor of the federal government? Should it instead be biased to protect traditional
state prerogatives? Or should no presumption attach in either direction?").
5. Professor Spiro does indicate that "internationalists" should embrace state
and local activity in foreign affairs, because it "should advance the cause of international law." Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 1, at 1268. The suggestion
made in this Article, in contrast, is that certain forms of subnational involvement
in foreign affairs are in the interest of the United States.
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different lens emerges through which to examine the limits that might be
imposed on state involvement in the interests of the Nation.
The occasion for these reflections is the Supreme Court's decision
last Term in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council," in which the Court
held that a federal statute preempted a Massachusetts public procurement
law barring purchases from suppliers doing business in Burma. In so doing, the Court refrained from holding broadly that the Constitution categorically excludes the States from the foreign policy arena, or even that
the Constitution gives rise to a presumption against such state involvement. Instead, the Court took pains to insist that its displacement of state
law was merely the result of a careful reading of the federal statute.
This Article will argue that Crosby is consistent with a recognition of
the national benefits of state involvement in foreign affairs and the view
that States may participate in foreign affairs to the extent these benefits
are realized. It will present the recent history of state participation in foreign affairs to illustrate the States' deep involvement in foreign policy matters and to present the many potential benefits thereof. To enrich our
understanding of the potential benefits of subnational involvement in foreign affairs, it will briefly consider similar involvement of component
states in the European Union and Germany. Drawing on this parallel experience, this Article will suggest that one major benefit of component
state involvement in foreign affairs is overcoming bureaucratic inertia at
the central level of governance. The Article then explores the doctrinal
consequences for the United States of an approach centered around this
recognition: States should not be excluded from the foreign policy arena,
States must not discriminate against their sister States in the pursuit of
foreign policy objectives, and any positive federal policy as articulated by
the political branches should be vigorously protected.
The following contribution to this Symposium will accordingly begin
(in Part II.A.) by describing the Court's decision in Crosby. It will then (in
Part II.B.) turn to the history of judicial concern about state involvement
in foreign affairs, which the Court's opinion in Crosby carefully avoided.
Part III will then review States' activities in the foreign affairs arena over
the past thirty years. It will demonstrate that States have been deeply engaged and, indeed, increasingly active in foreign policy matters ranging
from trade and investment issues to more "purely political" concerns.
Apart from demonstrating States' increased presence on the international
scene, this part will conclude that foreign affairs are difficult to distinguish
from domestic matters and that States may play several positive roles in the
Nation's conduct of foreign affairs. Part V, in turn, describes how the
federal government has indeed recognized some of the benefits of state
participation in foreign affairs, and how it has sought to include the States
in an important area of foreign policy making: international trade regulation. Part V adds a comparative perspective as a means to assist our under6. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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standing of the potentially positive aspects of component state
participation in foreign affairs. After briefly discussing the experience of
the European Union (Part V.A.) and Germany (Part V.B.) in which subnational participation in the governance of the system as a whole is mitigated
by a duty of fidelity to the common enterprise, this Part discusses three
potential conceptions of subnational support of the national interest that
might inform our approach in the United States (Part V.C.). Part VI then
explores the doctrinal consequences of an approach that specifically seeks
to preserve the potential benefits to the Nation of state participation in
foreign affairs. Part VII briefly returns to Crosby and presents two readings
of the case, one of which is compatible with the approach fleshed out in
Part VI. Part VIII provides a brief conclusion.
II.

THE COURT'S DECISION IN PERSPECTIVE

A.

The Court's Opinion in Crosby

At issue in Crosby was the constitutionality of a 1996 Massachusetts law
enacted in response to human rights abuses in Burma, barring state entities from purchasing goods or services from suppliers doing business in
that country. 7 A coalition of companies doing business in Burma brought
suit charging that the state law was unconstitutional in that it infringed
upon the federal foreign affairs power, contravened the Foreign Commerce Clause and was preempted by a federal statute enacted three
months after the state law had been passed. That federal act ("Act") set
forth a detailed scheme for imposing federal sanctions on Burma.8 It restricted U.S. aid to Burma, denied support for any international aid to the
country, 9 and severely limited the entry of Burmese officials into the
7. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22G-L (West 2000). The law contained
exceptions in the case of essential goods or services where the exclusion of a party

that otherwise met the criteria for exclusion would render the bidding uncompetitive or in the absence of other bidders. See MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 7,
§ 22H (b) (1) & (2), (d) (West 2000). It also excepted the media, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 7, § 22H(e) (West 2000), and essential medical supplies when no alternative supplier existed, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 221 (West 2000).
8. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (enacted by the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, § 101 (c), 110 Stat. 3009-121 to 3009-172).
9. The Federal law also directed Executive Branch officials to vote a certain
way in international institutions, a potentially unconstitutional usurpation of the
President's powers. Id. at § 570(c)(2) ("The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the U.S. executive director of each international financial institution to vote
against any loan or other utilization of funds of the respective bank to or for
Burma."). For a discussion of the ambiguities of the congressional-Executive relationship with regard to U.S. participation in international organizations and the
use of "voice and vote" provisions in various contexts, see Charles Tiefer, Adjusting
Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-ExecutiveControversies About InternationalOrganizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 239, 251 (2000) (noting that Clinton Administration
had not opposed attempts to impose "voice and vote" provisions, but that earlier
administrations had done so on grounds that such provisions encroached on executive power).
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United States until the President certified to Congress that Burma made
"measurable and substantial progress" toward safeguarding democracy
and human rights. The Act also authorized the President to prohibit "U.S.
persons" from making any "new investment" in Burma, and directed the
President to work with members of various international organizations towards "a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and
improve human rights practices and quality of life in Burma."' 0
The District Court sided with the plaintiffs, finding that the state law
"unconstitutionally impinge[d] on the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs."'" The Court of Appeals affirmed that
judgment, holding against the State separately on each of the three arguments originally set forth. It found that the law was an unconstitutional
interference with the federal government's power to conduct foreign affairs under Zschernig v. Miller,12 contravened the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 13 and was preempted by the federal act. 14 The Supreme
15
Court affirmed.
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court carefully avoided discussing the
first two claims, and instead affirmed solely on the ground that the state
law conflicted with the federal act. First, the Court held that the additional state sanctions undermined congressional intent to "provide the
President with flexible and effective authority over economic sanctions
against Burma." 16 Congress authorized the President to terminate existing sanctions, as well as impose new sanctions, after certifying to Congress the existence of various conditions. Indeed, the Act authorized the
President to terminate all sanctions upon certifying that their imposition
ran counter to U.S. national security interests. Upon reviewing this
scheme, the Court deemed it "simply implausible that Congress would
have gone to such lengths to empower the President if it had been willing
to compromise his effectiveness by deference to every provision of state
statute or local ordinance that might, if enforced, blunt the consequences
of discretionary Presidential action."' 7
Second, the Court found that the State's sanctions compromised Congress's clear intent to "steer a middle path" in the imposition of sanc10. Several months after the law was enacted, the President made the determinations necessary to impose additional sanctions, and ordered a halt to "new
investment" on the part of "U.S. persons." Exec. Order No. 13,047, § 1 (May 20,
1997), 3 C.F.R. 202 (1997).
11. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Stipp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass.
1998).
12.
F.3d 38,
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

389 U.S. 429 (1968); see also Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181
52-55 (1st Cir. 1999).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Natsios, 181 F.3d. at 61-71.
See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 71-77.
See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 376.
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tions. 18 The federal act, for example, authorized a ban on "new
investment," a term that Congress carefully defined to exclude, among
other things, "contract[s] to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology." 19 The state law, in contrast, was far more general in its sweep,
prohibiting all state purchasing from companies doing business in
Burma. 20 That the state and federal laws were ostensibly pursuing the
same goal did not pertain. The Court explained that "[s]anctions are
drawn not only to bar what they prohibit but to allow what they permit,"
and held that "the inconsistency of sanctions here undermines the con'2 1
gressional calibration of force."
Finally, the Court noted that the Massachusetts law frustrated Congress's intent to confer control over all U.S. sanctions against Burma upon
the President and thereby to enable him to work with foreign leaders and
international institutions on a "comprehensive, multilateral strategy" for
improving the situation in Burma. 22 In other words, the Congress conferred upon the President certain powers over foreign commerce in addition to whatever foreign affairs powers the President may have already had
under the Constitution alone. The Congress thus consolidated federal
power with regard to Burma sanctions in the President and thereby expressly empowered him to take the lead for the Nation on the issue of
Burma in the international community. The Massachusetts sanctions
threatened this scheme by diffusing control over sanctions, thus impeding
the President's "capacity ... for effective diplomacy. 2 : As the opinion
notes, "[ilt is not merely that the differences between the state and federal
Acts in scope and type of sanctions threaten to complicate discussions;
they compromise the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation
with one voice in dealing with other governments."2 4 Because Massachusetts' Burma sanctions ran contrary to the federal act, the Court declared
the state law preempted, and thus unconstitutional tinder the Supremacy
Clause.
18. Id.

19. 110 Stat. at 3009-3167.
20. The law contained exceptions in the case of essential goods or services
where the exclusion of a party that otherwise met the criteria for exclusion would

render the bidding tncompetitive or in the absence of other bidders. See MASS.

GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 7, § 22H(b) (1) & (2), (d) (West 2000). It also excepted the

media, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 22H(e) (West 2000), and essential medical
supplies when no alternative supplier existed, MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 7, § 221
(West 2000). Apart from these exceptions, however, the state law reached more
broadly than the federal act.

21. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380.
22. Id. at 364.
23. Id.
24. The Court found further evidence for this in the formal protests against
the Massachtsetts law that have been lodged by U.S. allies in Washington, D.C., the

European Union's (EU) and Japan's complaints filed against the United States
with the World Trade Organization, and the Executive Branch's representations
regarding the diplomatic difficulties caused by the state sanctions. See id. at 382-86.
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What the Crosby Court Avoided: A History of Distrust

The Court strenuously declined to discuss the constitutional role that
States generally should play in the foreign affairs arena. The decision expressly considered only the preemption argument and, in deciding the
issue of preemption, further refused to draw upon "any general consideration of limits on state action affecting foreign affairs." 25 Indeed, the closest the Court came to acknowledging any traditional hesitance about state
involvement in foreign affairs was in dismissing the State's argument that
Congress's silence militates against preemption, and noting that Congress's "failure to provide for preemption expressly may reflect nothing
more than the settled character of implied preemption doctrine that
courts will dependably apply." 26i Dispelling any hint that it might thereby
have heeded a particular tradition of implied preemption analysis distinct
to the realm of foreign affairs, however, the Court continued: "the existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy Clause does not depend
on express congressional recognition that federal and state law may
27
conflict."
By declining to discuss the States' constitutional role in foreign affairs, the Court avoided confronting a consistent theme that emerges from
the doctrinal thicket of its prior decisions on federalism in foreign affairs,
namely that state participation in foreign affairs can be only harmful to
the Nation. As early as 1827, for example, John Marshall, articulated this
concern in Brown v. Maryland,28 where he noted that state restrictions on
foreign commerce and on the importation of goods would inevitably lead
to adverse diplomatic consequences for the Nation as a whole. 2 "- That the
state law in that case was limited in scope, and might have been considered a prudent exercise of state power with few implications for the Nation's interests in foreign affairs, was irrelevant. In Marshall's view, the
issue was not whether the State's actions in fact interfered with the national interest or whether the State had exercised good judgment, but the
formal question of where the power resided. 3°' For Marshall, it was not
sufficient "to say, that [a disastrous] state of things will never be produced;
that the good sense of the States is a sufficient security against it."-' Indeed, Marshall suspected that the States naturally lacked such "good
25. Id. at 381.
26. Id. at 387.
27. Id. at 388.
28. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
29. See Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 447 ("What would be the language of a
foreign government, which should be informed that its merchants, after importing
according to law, were forbidden to sell the merchandise imported? What answer
would the U.S. give to the complaints and just reproaches to which such an extraordinary circumstance would expose them? No apology could be received, or
even offered. Such a state of things would break up commerce.").
30. See id.
31. Id.
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sense." He expected that a State would "provide judiciously for its own
32
interests," and thus predictably fail to "respect the interests of others."
Accordingly, Marshall opted for a formal rule, allocating the power over
imports and foreign commerce exclusively to the federal government; otherwise, in his view, the States would act in their own interests and provoke
33
foreign retaliation against the United States as a whole.
The idea that States' involvement in foreign affairs can only redound
to the disadvantage of the Nation has run through much of the Court's
foreign affairs jurisprudence ever since. A prominent discussion is in
4
Holmes v. Jennison,'3
in which ChiefJustice Taney, writing on behalf of four
Justices, expresses a similar mistrust of the States. The case involved Vermont's planned surrender of Holmes to Canadian authorities who sought
the extradition to press murder charges. Following Marshall in Brown, Taney presents the issue as one regarding power, not the exercise of good
judgment: "[I]f the power [to comply with extradition requests] remains
with the states, then every state of the Union must determine for itself the
principles on which they will exercise it; and there will be no restriction
upon the power, but the discretion and good feeling of each particular
state."35 In Taney's view, that was unacceptable. States could not be
trusted to act based on "good feeling" to their sister States or to heed the
interests of the Nation as a whole. As the Framers recognized, "any intercourse between a state and a foreign nation was dangerous to the Union"
and "open a door of which foreign powers would avail themselves to obtain influence in separate states."3 6; Accordingly, the Framers "anxiously
desired to cut off all connection or communication between a state and a
foreign power."'3 7 Taney's plurality thus sought to establish the exclusivity
32. Id. at 440.
33. This view of state interests echoes Justice Marshall's decision in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), holding that the States could not be
trusted with the power to tax federal instrumentalities, lest nothing would prevent
them from destroying the federal bank.
34. 38 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
35. Holmes, 38 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 568. Similarly, Taney expresses partictular concern over the fact that a State might in the future extradite a U.S. citizen (which
Holmes was not). Taney rejects the notion that the State might act differently, or
that the State's obligations might differ, in such a case: "[I]f the surrender of
Holmes is not repugnant to the Constitution of the U.S., there is nothing in that
instrument that forbids the delivery up of a citizen of any other state, when foUnd
within its borders." Id.
36. Id. at 574-75.
37. Id.at 572. Doctrinally, Taney argued that the planned extradition would
violate Article I, Section 1O's prohibition on entering into agreements with foreign
nations absent the consent of Congress. Despite the fact that there did not appear
to be any reciprocal agreement between Canada and Vermont, or any unilateral
commitment on the part of Vermont, but simply communication regarding the
logistics of Holmes's surrender, Taney concluded that an agreement in violation of
Article I, section 10, had been reached. To buttress this sweeping conclusion, Taney argued that "the use of all of these terms, 'treaty,' 'agreement,' 'compact,'
show that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to use the
broadest and most comprehensive terms, and that they anxiously desired to cut off
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of federal powers in this area, as opposed to controlling the States' exercise of concurrent powers in light of national interests. 3 8
So, too, more modern cases generally deem States' involvement in
foreign affairs detrimental to the foreign relations interests of the Nation.
In Zschernigv. Miller,39 for example, the Court held that state courts' examinations of foreign legal systems in the context of probate proceedings
harmed the Nation's foreign affairs. The Court found that these inquiries
demonstrated open hostility toward foreign nations and often strayed
from the requisite inquiry into whether certain factual predicates for receipt had been met.4" The Court there failed to invoke any particular
all connection or communication between a state and a foreign power." Id. at 572.
This reflected "one of the main objects of the Constitution," which was "to make
us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation." Id. at
575. Thus, although Taney nominally concluded that this case had involved an
"agreement" between Canada and Vermont, the root of the problem was simply
that any communication between a foreign nation and a State was suspect, because, ultimately, neither party could be trusted to keep in mind the interests of
the Nation as a whole. Nor was the Court in a position to police the parties'
proper consideration of these interests. If we are to be "one people, and one nation" with regard to foreign affairs, this unity can, according to Taney, only be
achieved by excluding the States from this realm of activity. In this sense, then,
Taney's argument goes well beyond the more persuasive prohibition on "bargaining" that Edward Swaine roots in Article I, Section 10. See generally Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 1.
38. For a similar approach, see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875)
(striking down California law requiring bond for arriving alien ship passengers,
holding that with exception of state laws "necessary and proper [to protect]
against paupers and convicted criminals from abroad," powers to regulate entry of
aliens into U.S. "belongs to Congress, and not to the states,"just as power to regulate foreign commerce "belongs solely to the national government," and noting
generally "[i]f it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in
disastrous quarrels with other nations").
39. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
40. Several years earlier, in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), the Court had
upheld a state probate rule requiring reciprocity before allowing a nonresident
alien to take personal property located within the State by succession or testamentary disposition. The Court held in Clark that the state policy was not properly
preempted by a conflicting treaty or federal law, and that the State had not entered into "the forbidden domain of negotiating with a foreign country" or entered into any compact or agreement in violation of Article 10. Id. at 517. Despite
the "incidental or indirect effect" of this policy in foreign countries, the Court
upheld the provision against constitutional challenge. See id. When the issue came
to the Court again in Zschernig, this time from a different State, the Court refused
to reconsider its holding in Clark, but reviewed the state court rulings that had
been issued since then. The Court found that many state courts were inquiring
rather deeply into the domestic legal structures of foreign nations. State courts
ostensibly did so in order to determine whether the condition that the nonresident
alien would actually receive and retain possession of the inheritance, and the further condition of reciprocity, were met. Trial courts, according to the Supreme
Court, had engaged in "minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of
foreign law, into the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and into speculation whether the fact that some received delivery of funds should 'not preclude
wonderment as to how many may have been denied 'the right to receive."'
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435.
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national policy with which the state courts' actions might conflict, and yet
dismissed the federal government's argument that the state activity in
question did not "unduly interfer[e] with the U.S.' conduct of foreign relations." 4 1 AsJustice Stewart noted in his concurrence, "[r]esolution of so
fundamental a constitutional issue [of whether certain state activity unduly
interfered with federal power over foreign affairs] cannot vary from day to
day with the shifting winds at the State Department. ' 42 Even absent any
specific conflict with a treaty or positive act of Congress, the Court held,
State forays into foreign policy "may disturb foreign relations. ' 43 Indeed,
whenever state activity "has a direct impact upon foreign relations ... [it]
may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with
those problems." 44 The conclusion in Zschernig was categorical: "([T] he
conduct of our foreign affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the
45
National Government, not to the probate courts of the several States."
Similarly, even those decisions that do not categorically exclude the
States from the foreign affairs arena, generally focus on the damage done
by States to the Nation's foreign policy or foreign commerce concerns.
These decisions present the gravamen as being a conflict with positive federal policy, as opposed to dormant federal power. As the Court held n
United States v. Pink,4" state laws and policies must "yield before the exercise of the external powers of the U.S.," otherwise they could thwart the
Nation's "foreign policy," leaving "[t]he nation as a whole ... to answer"
for difficulties created by a single State. 47 Again, the vision of state activity
as trouble for the Nation prevails. As Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
notably stated: "In our dealings with the outside world the U.S. speaks with
one voice and acts as one, unembarrassed by the complications as to do41. See Zschering, 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting Solicitor
General's statement).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 441.
44. Id.
45. Id. As dormant foreign policy analysis, Zschernig was an unusual case,
should be viewed as a "judicial reaction to a state's contributions to the Cold War,"
and has remained "a unique statement and a sole application of constitutional
doctrine." See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 165 (2d ed.
1996). See generally Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1643-61; Hans Linde,
A New Foreign-Relations Restraint on American States: Zschernig v. Miller, 28 ZIrSCHRIEF

FOR AUSL.ANDISCHES

OFFENTLICHES

RECH

UND V6LKERRECHT

594, 603

(1968); Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 1, at 1242. In its categorical
distrust of the states, however, Zschernig echoes older decisions, see supra notes 2940 and accompanying text, as well as more modern ones. See, e.g.,
Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (invoking application of "act of state"
doctrine and asserting federal jurisdiction over customary international law). Professor Spiro attributes this 1964 decision, in which the Court insisted on strong
control over the foreign policy activities of the states for fear of retribution imposed on the Nation as a whole, on Cold War politics as well. See Spiro, Foreign
Relations Federalisn, supra note 1, at 1244-45.
46. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
47. Pink, 315 U.S. at 232.
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mestic issues which are inherent in the distribution of political power be48
On this view,
tween the national government and the individual states."
then, States merely add "complications" that have no place in the foreign
49
affairs arena.
More recent decisions can be read to echo the idea that pluralism in
foreign affairs is simply an evil that it is best to contain. Thus in Japan Line
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,5°1 the Court struck down California's ad valorem
property tax on foreign shipping containers, because it impaired federal
"uniformity" and the ability of the federal government to "speak[ ] with
one voice."' 5 1 Sounding the theme of state involvement in foreign affairs
as detrimental to the Nation, the Court noted that a state tax on foreign
commerce could give rise to "international disputes" and "foreign ... retaliation . . . directed at American transportation equipment in general,
not just that of the taxing State, so that the Nation as a whole would
52
suffer."
Finally, even the Court's more moderate doctrine of positive federal
foreign affairs preemption was, prior to Crosby, based on a jaundiced view
of state participation in foreign affairs. The Court's most prominent pre53
emption case in the foreign affairs arena, Hines v. Davidowitz, for exam54
but
ple, refused to consider the question of dormant exclusivity,
nonetheless applied a presumption against state involvement in foreign
affairs. It, too, voices the idea that States' involvement in foreign affairs is
dangerous to the Nation. The Court struck down Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act after inquiring generally whether the state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."5 5 Pennsylvania's scheme differed in some ways
from the subsequently enacted federal Alien Registration Act, but those
48. Id. at 242.
49. AsJustice Sutherland famously put it in United States v. Belmont "In respect
of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes, the state of New York
does not exist." Justice Sutherland's view was reminiscent of his opinion for the
Court in United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), in which he
set forth his general argument for the transfer of foreign relations power from the
Crown to the Union of the Articles of Confederation and then to the federal government under the Constitution. That theory, which "did not depend on the affirmative grants of the Constitution," id. at 318, has suffered widespread academic
criticism. Cf HENKIN, supra note 45, at 19-20 (citing critics of Curtiss-Wright).
50. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
51. JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 456.
52. Id. at 450-51 (citations and footnotes omitted); cf. Container Corp. of Am.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (quoting and applying Japan Line, but
upholding unitary business rule for state corporate franchise tax).
53. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
54. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 63 (refraining from reaching "the argument that the
federal power in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive").
55. Id. at 67. Although formally this is classified as "obstacle preemption," see,
e.g., Goldsmith, Statutory ForeignAffairs Preemption, supra note 1, at 202, it may in this
instance also be recognized as a form of "field preemption."
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differences ultimately were not dispositive. Instead, the Court explained
more generally that where Congress:
in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a
complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary
56
regulations.
The Court's judgment regarding preemption was strongly influenced
by a general recognition of the national interest in conducting foreign
policy and concomitant fears about allowing States to regulate in the area.
The Court specifically emphasized the delicacy surrounding the treatment
of aliens, adding: "it is of importance that this legislation is in a field which
affects international relations, the one aspect of our government that from
the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad
national authority. ' 57 In other words, regardless of whether in a different
context an act such as this one would have preempted the field, 58 in the
foreign affairs context such an act did. 59 In that context, the federal government alone represents "the collective interest of the ... states."" Accordingly, both local and national interests demand that the federal
government's authority in foreign affairs "be left entirely free from local
interference." 6 ' In light of this strong predisposition against state "interference" matters affecting the Nation's foreign relations, the Court unsurprisingly had little difficulty concluding that Congress sought to establish
"a single integrated and all-embracing" aliens registration system that was
intended to preclude the States from adding auxiliary registration require62
ments on law-abiding aliens within their jurisdiction.
Among the various strands of foreign affairs jurisprudence set forth
above, Hines's preemption doctrine figures most prominently in Crosby.
Crosby both decides the case on preemption grounds and cites Hines's "obstacle" test as guiding the inquiry. Yet from reading the Court's opinion in
Crosby, we would not know that Hines strongly emphasized the foreign affairs context of its preemption inquiry. Indeed, Crosby studiously avoids
citing or quoting any portion of Hines that discusses general considerations of the federal/state balance in foreign affairs. And Crosby refrains
56. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66.
57. Id. at 68.
58. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 1,at 202.
59. As Professor Tribe noted in comparing different instances of the Court's
determination in favor of field preemption, in Hines "the Court was extremely solicitous of the paramount federal interest in matters germane to foreign affairs."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 1210 (3d ed., 2000).
60. Hines, 312 U.S. at 63.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 74.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss5/4

12

Halberstam: The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on
2001]

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FEDERAL SYSTEMS

1027

from quoting the Hines proviso about the specific foreign affairs context in
which federal power is broad and state power is at a minimum. Instead,
Crosby simply quotes Hines's general "obstacle" formula and approaches
the question as one of preemption without presumption. 6 3 In doing do,
Crosby avoids the general theme of prior cases that States can do only harm
to the Nation when they become involved in foreign relations.
In sum, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on federalism in foreign
affairs has consistently focused on the detriment of state activity in this
area to the Nation as a whole. Crosby is a departure from that tradition in
that it refrains from making any general observations on the relation between the States and the federal government in this arena. As the next
section will show, such restraint may be wise, as not all state involvement in
foreign affairs is detrimental to the foreign affairs interests of the Nation.
Indeed, as the following section's review of state participation in foreign
affairs indicates, state activity may benefit the Nation as well.
111.

STATE AND

LOCAL

PARTICIPATION IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARENA

State and local activities in the foreign affairs arena, while not a new
phenomenon, 64 have expanded over the past thirty years. As the sphere
of international activity has grown beyond issues of security and state recognition to reach many economic, social, cultural, and environmental issues previously regulated at the national or subnational level of
government, subnational governments within federal systems worldwide
have taken an increased interest in the conduct of foreign affairs. 15 The
63. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67); see also id. at 374 n.8 (expressly rejecting application of
any preemption presumption.
64. For a useful discussion of the history of state involvement in the making
and pursuit of U.S. foreign policy, see Dennis James Palumbo, The States and
American Foreign Relations 290 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author) (reviewing episodes of States' involvement in
foreign affairs dating back to early nineteenth century and concluding that "States
participate in foreign relations in many areas," and noting that "States have had
extensive influence in foreign relations in regard to economic issues, border issues, minority groups, treaty negotiations, cultural exchanges, and national
defense").
65. See generally FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-THE ROLE OF
SUBNATIONAL UNITS (Hans J. Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990); FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL SYSTEMS (Brian Hocking ed., 1993); BRIAN HOCKING,
LOCALIZING FOREIGN POLICY (1993) [hereinafter HOCKING, LOCALIZING FOREIGN
POLICY]; ROBERT 0.

WORLD POLITICS

IN

KEOHANE & JOSEPH

S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE:

TRANSITION (1977); Foreign Policy in FederalStates, 61 INT'LJ. 3

(Robert O. Matthews & Charles Pentland eds., 1986); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy
and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 459 (1988). This is
not to say that international law has never reached deeply into domestic matters.
See Golove, Treaty Making, supra note 1, at 1104-16 (discussing regulation of aliens'
rights to dispose of their property under bilateral treaties). Yet many issues previously thought of as exclusively domestic matters, such as a State's treatment of its
own citizens, have in the past century become a principal target of international
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States within the U.S. federal system are no exception. 6 States have vigorously promoted trade and investment opportunities, and also engaged in
international initiatives for more "political" purposes, such as effecting
change in conditions or policies within foreign nations." 7 Although many
of these activities, taken individually, may be considered marginal or even
obscure, taken together they amount to a pervasive subnational force in
the conduct of the Nation's foreign affairs.
Apart from demonstrating the immense level of state activity in this
arena, this part argues that although tensions between federal and state
policies do emerge periodically, state activities often benefit the Nation.
State officials are frequently in a better position to promote trade and investment opportunities at home. Relative to federal actors, state officials
may enjoy an informational advantage relevant to crafting or carrying out
international agreements. State officials may assist national policymakers
by providing broad political support that differs from the support garnered by organized economic interests. And independent state action
may induce federal officials to take up international issues that would otherwise not make it onto their policy agenda. Indeed, the federal government has frequently embraced the state and local concerns as its own and,
especially in the area of trade and investment, has regularly included state
and local governmental representatives in the formulation of federal foreign policy itself.
A.

Trade and Investment

Prior to 1970, States and local governments rarely engaged in international economic activities. 68 In the early 1970s, however, the slowdown in
the domestic economy led to a general search for alternative means of
economic expansion, and state officials set their gaze abroad." 9 As a result, state activity has burgeoned in this sector, and international economic development has since become perhaps the most significant area of
state foreign policy activity. 7" As Bayless Manning noted, the deep global
law. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1. But see Koh, supra note I
(responding to Bradley & Goldsmith).
66. See, e.g.,JOIIN M. KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 2, 23-24, 35-36 (1983) [hereinafter KLINE, STATE GOVERN-

MENT] (explaining that States now view foreign policy issues as highly relevant).
67. For a brief discussion of potential reasons for subnational foreign policy
involvement in such "political" issues, see HansJ. Michelmann, Conclusion, FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs-THE ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL UNITS, supra

note 65, at 299-306; HOCKING, LocALIZINc" FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 65, at 18-24.
68. See EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 67 (1998). Although there was some level of state and local
activity, the prevailing idea was that centralization would inevitably proceed. See id.
69. See, e.g., KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 53-55.
70. Ivo Duchacek traces the development back to the 1960s. See Ivo D.
Duchacek, Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in International
Relations, in FEDERALISM

AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs-TIIE

ROLE OF SUBNA-

TIONAL UNITS, supra note 65, at 1, 5. John Kline suggests that the involvement of
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interdependence in the economic arena has fostered this activity by blurring the distinction between domestic and international matters:
The economic interdependence of the modern world is more
than international. It is also inter-local ..... [A]Imost every region and every economic group is on some way in the export or
import business or, usually, both. As a result, every jiggle in the
pattern of the international economy is likely to pinch some local
group ....71
Although some state activity has been an isolationist reaction to this interdependence, 72 much has entailed reaching out and engaging vigorously
with foreign nations and their subnational units of government.
73
For example, almost every State has sent trade delegations abroad,
and several have individual offices that coordinate comprehensive policy
on international affairs for the State. 7 4 State officials often bargain with
the states in foreign affairs is due to the "increased global economic interdependence effects that reached U.S. shores relatively late due to the country's aberrant
economic dominance in the immediate aftermath of World War I1destruction."
KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 66, at 2. For the view that global interdependence was extensive nearly one hundred years earlier, but had been systematically suppressed in the wake of World War 1, see PAUL KRUGMAN, POP
INTERNATIONALISM 205-14 (1996).
For an account of the impact of global economic interdependence on the structure of business and industry, see generally
FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE

21ST

CENTURY:

COMPETITION POLICY IN

reprinted in 70
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1765 (Special Supp.) June 6, 1996).
THE NEW HIGH-TECH GLOBAL MARKETPLACE,

ANTITRUST

&

TRADE

71. Bayless Manning, The Congress, the Executive, and the InternesticAffairs: Three
Proposals, 55 FOREIGN ApF. 306, 309 (1977).
72. SeeJames D. Southwick, Binding the States: A Survey of State Law Conformance
with the Standards of the GA7lXProcurement Code, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 57, 73-76

(1992) (reviewing States' "buy American" and "buy in-State" legislation); see also
KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 87-107 (describing "buy American"
movement and similar state and local measures to limit foreign business and investment activities in United States). The federal government maintains a similar
policy. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (2000). For a discussion of these policies in the
context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 224-28 (2d ed. 1997).
73. See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM.

J. INT'L L. 821, 822 (1989). In 1993 alone, twenty-seven states led a total of eightythree trade and investment missions to foreign countries. See FRY, supra note 68, at
69. By 1994, thirty-nine states and Puerto Rico maintained a total of 162 foreign
offices all over the world. See id. at 68-69. Today, States maintain a total of nearly
260 overseas offices and representatives to advance their interests abroad. See International

Trade

Administration,

National Export

Directory,

at

http://

www.ita.doc.gov/TICFrameset.html (see "Trade Offices Nationwide" and "NED by
State") (last visited Mar. 31, 2001); see also National Association of State Information Resource Executives Representing Chief Information Officers of the States,
Economic Development
and
Commerce,
at http://www.nasire.org/
stateSearch/displayCategory.cfm?Category=Economic (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
74. See generally Eduardo E. Neret & Marcio W. Valladares, The Florida International Affairs Act: A Model for State Activism in Foreign Affairs, I J. TRANS. L. & POL'Y

197 (1992). California is particularly active in this regard, with its five state agen-
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foreign investors and exercise state regulatory powers to attract business to
the region. 75 And States cooperate with one another, as in the creation of
the National Association of State Development Agencies (NASDA), which
has coordinated trade and investment missions to cities abroad, 76 and the
Council of American States in Europe, which coordinates the activities of
77
U.S. States with offices in Western Europe.
Subnational cooperation in trade and investment matters includes coordination not only among U.S. States, but with foreign officials as well.
Direct action to attract investment, for example, may involve high level,
quasi-diplomatic exchanges, as in the case of California's recent agreement with Israel to create a California-Middle East Economic Task Force
in support of economic development opportunities between California
and the Middle East region.7 8 States have also established regional councils and organizations whose membership extends beyond domestic borders, such as the Pacific Northwest Economic Region, which encourages
regional economic development,79 or the Three Californias Commission,
which coordinates contacts between California and the two Mexican Baja
Californias.80 Governors, apart from leading trade and investment missions overseas, have similarly established transnational regional organizations.8 1 In addition, state officials specifically engage with their foreign

cies devoted to foreign trade issues, and twelve foreign offices. See California Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency, Finding Markets, at http://
commerce.ca.gov/international/ithome.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2001).
75. Shrewd companies can, however, play state officials off against one another in an effort to cut the best deal. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, ARROGANT CAPITAL:
WASHINGTON, WALL STREET, AND THE FRUSTRATION OF AMERICAN POLITics 72
(1994). See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1573 (2000); Andrew L. Kolesar,
Note, Can State and Local Tax Incentives and Other Contributions Stimulate Economic
Development?, 44 TAx LAw. 285 (1990).
76. See KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 42-43.
77. FRY, supra note 68, at 75.
78. See California Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency, FindingMarkets,
at http://commerce.ca.gov/international/ithome.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2001); California Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency, California Creates
Mid-East Economic Cooperation Task Force: Pact Will Support RegionalEconomic Development, at http://commerce.ca.gov/latest/press/2000/pr947635921.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2001).
79. See FRY, supra note 68, at 73.
80. Ivo C. Duchacek, The InternationalDimension of SubnationalSelf-Government,
14 PUBLIUS 5, 10 (1984) [hereinafter Duchacek, InternationalDimension]. Similar
border state arrangements exist in Arizona and New Mexico. See id.
81. SeeJohn Kincaid, American Governors in InternationalAffairs, 14 PUBLIUS 95,
107 (1984) (discussing mid-America International Agri Trade Council, Southeast
U.S.-Japan Association and Western Governors' International Market Development Project); FRY, supra note 68, at 73 (discussing organization of Northeast Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEGCEP)).
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counterparts to attract business not only to the U.S. but to neighboring
8
foreign regions as well.

2

Although such activity may lead to costly competition among the
States, 83 direct state involvement may also redound to the benefit of the
United States by, for example, effectively attracting foreign investment,
which States are often in the best position to do. Thus, state governors,
for example, have emerged as the chief economic ombudsman to promote local industry as well as trade and investment opportunities
abroad. 84 Governors provide foreign investors-be they governmental or
private-with a single contact for help and guidance in dealing with domestic regulation and business practices. In the words of one observer:
"The presence of the governor in establishing foreign economic relations
adds an air of assurance that the state will serve as a trustworthy partner,
and that foreign investors will not be left to fend entirely for themselves in
the wilds of the American economy." 8 5 U.S. cities have similarly engaged
in economic development activities through the U.S. Conference of Mayors. 86 And taking up the role of chief spokesperson for the economic de-

velopment of their locale, several big city mayors have led large trade and
investment missions abroad, 8 7 and even smaller cities, such as Denver and
Duluth, have followed suit.88 Indeed, the federal government itself has
acknowledged the ability of state and local officials effectively to promote
U.S. investment opportunities abroad, especially when communicating
82. For example, California's trade and commerce secretary accompanied a

Mexican delegation to South Korea to help convince Daewoo to establish a $270
million television picture tube plant across the border in Baja California Norte. See
FRY, supra note 68, at 74.
83. See generally Howard N. Fenton, III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw. J. INT. L. & Bus. 563
(1993).
84. See Kincaid, supra note 81, at 105-06, 110.
85. Id. at 106.
86. See Duchacek, InternationalDimension, supra note 80, at 5. The U.S. Conference of Mayors, for example, coordinated an event in Zuirich, in which representatives from 180 U.S. cities, port authorities and state or local development or
trade agencies vied for Swiss business. Id. at 6.
87. For example, San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown led a successful seventymember delegation to France in November, 1996, see FRY, supra note 68, at 84-85,
and New York City led similar missions to Britain, France and Germany in 1992, see
James C. McKinley, Jr., Dinkins Returningfrom Europe, Hoping Investment Will Follow, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1992, at § 1-25; James C. McKinley Jr., Dinkins Heads for
Europe as City's Salesman, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at § 1-21. A decade earlier, New
York City had already led missions to England and West Germany, see Robin Herman & Laurie Johnston, New York Day by Day, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1983, at B-5, as
well as to China and Japan, see Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Koch, Gift-Laden, Departsfor
China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1980, at § 1-23.
88. See, e.g.,James Brooke, Goodbye, Cowtown; DenverEnters the World Arena, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 20, 1999, at A10 (noting that Denver Mayor Webb led delegation of
eleven other American mayors on ten-day trip to Senegal, Ghana); William H. Honan, Sister Cities Of World Unite; Duluth Finds a Key to the Global Economy, and Cultural
Ties, Too, N.Y. TIMES,Jul. 8, 2000, at C1 (discussing non-profit city-to-city network).
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investments

in

the

U.S.

Political Activity

State and local governments have also engaged in foreign policy initiatives with more "political" goals in mind, that is, to promote policies
unrelated to their own economic development. D1 Sometimes these "political" activities are difficult to distinguish from the more basic economic
and cultural engagement of which they are a part. At other times, the
principal purpose of the action is clearly the "political" goal itself. Here,
too, we see prominent instances, particularly of collective state and local
action, in which such engagement may be considered useful for the Nation as a whole.
Cities, Counties, and States, for example, have forged formalized ties
across national boundaries, which promote business, professional, cultural, and educational exchanges as well as advancing political engagement more generally. Currently, 1300 U.S. communities have established
formal links with 2400 of their counterparts in 137 nations, and all fifty
States, as well as American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico and Washington,
D.C., have formed a total of 201 relationships with subnational units of
government in approximately fifty foreign nations. 9 1 In some instances,
these relationships preceded formal diplomatic ties at the national level,
as in the case of Cuba, where at least six U.S. cities have sister city relationships with Cuban counterparts. 92 In others, sister city relationships were
used to bring into focus human rights and social justice issues otherwise
neglected by the federal government. 93 Local officials have used visits to
89. See

KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT,

supra note 66, at 72 (citing U.S.

GENERAL

ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES-THE FEDERAL ROLE,

REPORT

TO

THE

CONGRESS BY THE

COMPTROLLER

GENERAL OF THE

UNrrED STATES ii(1980)).

In part, this attitude is a reaction to the fact that the
"State Department advises its Embassies that promotional activities disrupt market
forces .... Id. The States as market actors can act self-interestedly in a manner
that federal agencies cannot. Id.
90. See generally Fenton, supra note 83.
91. Telephone interview with Cynthia Maka, Regional Director for Asia and
Oceania, Sister Cities International (Feb. 28, 2001). See generally http://www.sistercities.org.
92. The relationships are: Mobile (AL)-Habana; Madison (Wl)-Camaguey;
Pittsburgh (PA)-Matanzas; Bloomington (IN)-Santa Clara; Richmond (CA)-Regla;
and Oakland (CA)-Santiago. Three more have been agreed upon, but not yet executed: Takoma (WA)-Cienftiegos; Milwaukee (WI)-Neuvitas; and Philadelphia
(PA)-Cardenas. Several more are in progress. Telephone interview with Lisa Valanti, President of U.S. Cuba Sister Cities Association (Feb. 28, 2001). See generally
http://www.USCSCA.org.
93. See, e.g., John M. Kline, Managing Intergovernmental Tensions: Shaping a
State and Local Role in U.S. Foreign Relations, inFOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL
STATES, supra note 65, at 105, 113 [hereinafter Kline, Intergovernmental Tensions]
(noting sister city programs with "black townships in South Africa, small rural communities on the edge of conflict areas in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Palestinian
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highlight political issues,9 4 and even trade missions have taken on significant political content, as when Idaho sponsored missions to Libya in the
1970s and hosted Libyan missions in the United States.95 Trade, development and politics are similarly intertwined when the U.S. Conference of
Mayors pursues the creation of an international alliance with counterparts
throughout the world, engages Chinese mayors in the form of a coopera96
tive agreement and promotes cooperation in the Middle East.
Beyond such hybrid activities, many cities and counties have formally
expressed their views on a host of foreign policy matters, including the
Vietnam War, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the status of Taiwan
and nuclear disarmament.9 7 Others have gone further and limited their
investments, much in the way Massachusetts did with its procurement regulations, in order to further political objectives.98 Yet other state and local
officials have obstructed the movement of foreign officials in the United
States based on foreign policy considerations."
towns in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, cities in the former Soviet Union..., and
communities in China").
94. SeeJames C. McKinley, Jr., Angry Dinkins Defends Travel to South Africa, N.Y.

Oct. 12, 1991, at § 1-33.
95. See FRY, supra note 68, at 92. Libya sought, by various means, including
retaining the services of Billy Carter as a lobbyist, to obtain replacement parts for

TIMES,

its stock of American-built aircraft and to purchase new commercial planes from
the U.S. See P. EDWARD HALEY, QADDAFI AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1969 147-54
(1984). In part, the Libyan-Idaho contacts were an effort to influence Senator
Frank Church, then Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee. SeeWilliam Safire,
Libya and Idaho, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1979, at A27.
96. See U.S. Conference of Mayors, InternationalAffairs, U.S. MAYOR NEWSPAPER (2000), available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/us-mayor-newspaper/
documents/06_26_00/internationalarticle.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2001); U.S.
Conference of Mayors, Press Release, Conference President Coles to Lead U.S. Delegation
to International Mayors Conference in Jerusalem (Mar. 15, 2001), at http://
www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/press-releases/documents/israe1031 501.asp (last
visited Sept. 2, 2001).
97. FRY, supra note 68, at 92 (stating that seven cities held referenda on Vietnam War; three measures opposing war succeeded; over 200 local governments
passed resolutions expressing support for Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty); id. at 96 (noting legislative resolutions and gubernatorial trips to Taiwan);
Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN POL'Y
154 (1986-87) ("More than 900 local governments . . . passed a nuclear freeze
resolution and helped pressure President Ronald Reagan to launch the Strategic
Arms Reductions Talks in Geneva.").
98. Seventeen States and forty municipalities have expressed their views on
Northern Ireland, endorsing the "MacBride principles," which seek to eliminate
discrimination against Catholics and accordingly limit pension fund and other investments in companies violating these principles. SeeJohn M. Kline, Continuing
Controversies Over State and Local Foreign Policy Sanctions in the U.S., 29 PUBLIUS I11,
116 (1999) [hereinafter Kline, Continuing Controversies];see also FRY, supra note 68,
at 95; Fenton, supra note 83, at 569; Kevin Whitelaw, The Vey Long Arm of the Law:
Is the World Ready for 7,284 Secretaries of States?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 14,
1996, at 57 (discussing selective purchasing laws).
99. In 1983, after a Soviet aircraft downed the Korean Airlines passenger jet,
the governors of New York and New Jersey imposed a temporary embargo on So-
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More significantly, state and local governments have in recent history
intervened collectively 'in several foreign policy issues that ultimately became issues of national importance. In these instances, the States dramatically imposed economic and regulatory pressures to make their voices
heard at national and international levels. And while federal officials have
criticized these actions along the way, the federal government ultimately
took up these concerns and in some cases embraced subnational government views in resolving the underlying issue.
In the 1970s, for example, the federal government had considered,
but initially failed, to take action in response to the Arab League's boycott
of Israel. The boycott was extensive. Members of the Arab League refused
to engage in direct economic relations with Israel, to deal with corporations doing significant business with Israel and to purchase any goods with
components made by boycotted firms. Despite the lack of political support at the national level, local pressure sufficed to move thirteen States to
pass their own anti-boycott measures. 100 Several States, including New
York, New Jersey, Illinois, California, Ohio, Massachusetts and Maryland,
enacted legislation that provided for penalties, including fines and imprisonment for U.S. residents, for compliance with the terms of the boycott. 10 1 Others used their antitrust laws, or threatened their use, against
complying individuals and firms. 10 2 While these actions were not without
international effect, their primary purpose was to force a nationwide dialogue on this issue in the United States and to move the federal government to take action, which the sponsors of the state measures considered
overdue.1 0 3 And indeed, due in part to the diversity of state legislation,
which apparently created difficulties both for business and diplomats, support for comprehensive federal action ultimately coalesced. Soon after
many of the state provisions were in place, the Congress passed the Export
Administration Act, preempting state laws and staking out a comprehen11 4
sive national position against the boycott.
viet spirits, see FRY, supra note 68, at 92, and refused to allow Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to land at their local airports, see Kincaid, supranote 81, at 96.
Instead of attempting to preempt these policies, President Reagan allowed Gromyko to land at a nearby federal airbase, but Gromyko cancelled his planned trip
to the United Nations. Id. New York City recently welcomed Gerry Adams, the
Sinn Fein leader, to City Hall, and evicted Yasser Arafat from a New York Philharmonic concert. See FRY, supra note 68, at 98.
100. See generally FRY, supra note 68.
101. See KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT," supra note 66, at 187-94.
102. See id. at 189.
103. See, e.g., id. at 192 (quoting Maryland's Attorney General Francis B.
Burch making case for federal preemption in testimony before U.S. House of
Representatives).
104. See Kline, Continuing Controversies,supra note 98, at 155; Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503. The Act prohibited any cooperation with the Arab boycott of Israel by categorically forbidding U.S. citizens
from refusing to do business with states boycotted by a third country and from
engaging in employment discrimination or providing the kind of information the
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The States again prominently flexed their foreign policy muscle in
the 1980s to protest South Africa's apartheid policy. 1°1 5 Since the early
1970s, students, religious organizations, civil rights groups, human rights
groups and labor unions had engaged in a grass roots lobbying effort of
state and local governments. 10 6 As a general matter, the lobbying effort
was not deeply coordinated, but rather the result of numerous disparate
organizations networking in their search for effective local means of putting pressure on the South African government. 10 7 Here, too, local activity was in some tension with the "constructive engagement" approach
taken by national officials at the time.' 08 Yet state and local activity may
have raised awareness of the issue to the point of demanding a more specific federal response. After twenty-eight States, as well as 130 cities and
counties, enacted sanctions against enterprises doing business with South
Africa, the federal government finally took action, passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. l 0 9
Arab boycott office in Damascus used to promote the boycott. It did, however,
permit firms to obey local laws when operating in foreign jurisdictions. For a
broader history of the Arab boycott and efforts in the U.S. to counteract it, see
generally AARONJ. SARNA, BOYCOTT AND BLACKLIST: A HISTORY OF ARAB ECONOMIC
WARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL (1986).
105. See generally JANICE LOVE, THE U.S. ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT: LOCAL
ACrIVISM IN GLOBAL POLITICS (1985); Kevin P. Lewis, Dealingwith South Africa: The
Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469 (1987);
PeterJ. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion Upon the
FederalPower in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813 (1986).
106. See LovE, supra note 105, at 29-31. On local activism of international
dimensions more generally, see HOCKING, LOCALIZING FOREIGN POLICY, supra note
65, at 15-18, and Michael Clough, Grass-Roots Policymaking, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 2
(1994).
107. See LovE, supra note 105, at 50-51.
108. See, e.g., Kline, Intergovernmental Tensions, supra note 93, at 111; Spiro,
Foreign RelationsFederalism,supra note 1, at 827-31. See generally Chester Crocker, An
Update of ConstructiveEngagement in South Africa, 85 DEP'T STATE BULL. 2094 (1985)
(providing testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs before Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs).
109. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-440, 100 Stat.
1086 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.). See FRY, supra note 68, at 5; see also Lewis,
supra note 105, at 471-472 (noting that at least nineteen States and sixty-two cities
and counties had passed divestment measures). During the mid-1980s, state and
local sanctions found support in a Democratic Congress that opposed the "constructive engagement" policy of the Reagan Administration. See Garrett M. Smith,
Note, Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore: Public PensionFund Divestment of South
African Securities Upheld, 49 MD. L. REv. 1030, 1047 (1990). In Board of Trustees v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Lubman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990), the court
found no congressional intent to preempt subnational sanctions against South Africa; indeed, it found that Congress had by negative implication failed to preempt
state legislation. See id. (addressing negative implication argument and citing H.R.
549, which was passed contemporaneous with Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and
which expressly declared that it was House's intent not to preempt other sanctions); see also David M. Billings, Decision: Foreign Affairs Powers-PreemptionApartheid-State and Local Divestiture Laws, 84 Am. J. INT'L. L. 568 (1990).
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More recently, subnational foreign policy pressure contributed to obtaining a settlement of claims arising out of German and Swiss government and corporate conduct during the Nazi era."10 State and local
government officials intervened prominently to put pressure on Swiss
banks still holding assets of Holocaust victims to settle the accounts with
the victims' heirs. A coalition of 900 state and local officials threatened to
impose sanctions in the form of selective investment policies' II and regulatory restraints. 112 Although the U.S. State Department originally opposed such actions, I I it was not opposed to a settlement of the claims.
The federal government chose not to preempt the state action, but instead
took up the issue and mediated the negotiations between the parties.
State and local pressures continued to be the moving force throughout
the negotiations. According to the Washington Post, the threat of state and
local sanctions was "a major factor in inducing the banks to settle,"' 14 and
the Financial Times reported that "every important breakthrough in the
negotiations came soon after threats from US local government officials to
impose sanctions." 15 Swiss banks offered a settlement only shortly before
the New York Banking Department was to decide on the approval of the
merger of the New York branches of UBS and SBC to form the world's
third largest bank." 1 The state Banking Department, which had previously cited Swiss inaction on this issue as a source of concern, now approved the merger, referring to the "sea change" in attitude regarding the
wartime accounts.' ' 7 State officials across the United States soon followed
suit and withdrew their threat of sanctions.' I8
State and local officials similarly put pressure on German government
and industry to settle Holocaust claims. New York's Banking Board again
threatened to block a merger, this time of Deutsche Bank with Bankers
110. See generally Kline, Continuing Controversies,supra note 98, at 121-23, 126-

29.
111. State and local governments, for example, threatened to withdraw pension funds from accounts connected with the targeted banks. SeeJoan Warner &
John Parry, Swiss Banks: The Noose Tightens, Bus. WK., Jul. 27, 1998, at 66.
112. State officials, for example, raised objections in the approval process of
the merger between the Union Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Bank Corporation.
See Reject Bank Merger, New York Tells Fed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at BI.
113. See David Cay Johnston, New York Officials to Impose Sanctions on Swiss
Banks Sept. 1, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 3, 1998, at A3 (quoting State Department position

that sanctions were "unjustified, unwarranted and counterproductive").
114. John M. Goshko, Swiss Banks'PactEnds N.Y Threat of Sanctions; Holocaust
Victims' Heirs Due Restitution, WASri. PosT, Aug. 14, 1998, at A14.
115. John Atthers & Richard Wolfe, Wlhen Sanctions Work, FIN. TIMES

(London), Sept. 9, 1998, at 22.
116. See David E. Sanger, Swiss Banks Said to Offer Holocaust Payment, N.Y.
TIMES,

Jun. 5, 1998, at A9 (discussing settlement offer negotiations and merger

approval).
117. See id.
118. See John Authers & William Hall, Holocaust Deal Ends Sanctions Threat,
FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 14, 1998, at 2; Amy Waldman, Holocaust Accord Ends
Planfor Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at A8.
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Trust, unless a satisfactory settlement regarding the German bank's activities during the Nazi-era was reached.' II As in the case of the Swiss banks,
the federal government became involved in the negotiations and helped
mediate the process. Thus, rather than simply preempting local activism
as threatening to the Nation, federal policymakers came to recognize the
issue as one of legitimate national concern. Although counterfactuals are
very difficult to prove, it is quite likely that the federal government would
not have embraced this issue as vigorously as it did if state activity had not
placed the question squarely on the federal government's agenda. As with
the Swiss banks case, federal negotiators took up the local officials' concern, and ultimately helped bring about a positive settlement of the
issue. 120
A third recent episode relates to the European insurance industry and
the unpaid claims and expunged policies of Holocaust victims. Here,
again, local regulators brought their influence to bear in the international
scene, with regulators in California leading the charge. State insurance
regulators threatened to withhold regulatory certification and blocked local mergers based on the European insurers' failure to cooperate in the
settlement of claims. The National Association of (State) Insurance Commissioners subsequently brought European regulators and insurance companies to participate in an International Commission on Holocaust Era
Insurance Claims (ICHEIC).' 2 1 The Commission comprises state regulators and their European counterparts, as well as representatives of European insurance companies, public interest groups and the State of
Israel. 12 2 The U.S. State Department participates as an "observer," as do
23
representatives of several other interested governments.1
In part due to the fact that these claims arise in the insurance sector,
an area generally left to state regulation, the States have been able to participate significantly in addressing this international issue. Although the
Congress might have preempted the States, it has chosen not to do so.
Instead, the State Department strongly supported the state run Commission and prodded European insurers to cooperate with the ICHEIC to
119. See John Authers, Holocaust Pressure on Germany, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 2, 1999, at 3.
120. See, e.g., Associated Press, Fed Clears a Planned U.S.-German Bank Merger,
N.Y. Times, May 21, 1999, at C22; Roger Cohen, German Companies Adopt Fund for
Slave Laborers Under Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at Al.
121. See Lisa S. Howard, Holocaust-Era Claims Dispute Kills Re Deal, NAT'L UNDERWRITER (LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERVIcES EDITION), Aug. 21, 2000, at 1; David E.
Sanger, U.S. Shifts From Nazi Gold To Art, Land and Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1998, at A6; Richard Wolffe, European Insurers Set to Unveil Deal on Holocaust Payments, FIN. TIMES (London), July 21, 1999, at 14.
122. SeeJohn M. Goshko, Holocaust Panel Tries to Enlist Eagleburgeras Chairman,
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1998, at A33.

123. See Press Release, International Holocaust Era Insurance Commission
Launches Worldwide Outreach to Unpaid Policy Claimants (Feb. 16, 2000), availa-

ble at http://www.icheic.org/eng/press.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2001).
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reach a settlement of the claims.' 2 4 State influence grew beyond what was
acceptable to the Executive Branch, when California subsequently enacted
a law requiring European insurers to disclose certain information. But
25
even the State Department's opposition to this increased state pressure'
did not lead Congress to intervene. The federal government thus has not
authoritatively stepped in to declare a particular national policy with
which the state actions conflict. Nor has the Supreme Court's decision in
Crosby led to outright preemption of state efforts. 126 In short, the dialogue
on this issue between the States and the federal government is still in
progress.
C.

Summary

Within the broad range of activities described above, it would be difficult to cordon off any particular realm as being without potentially serious
implications for the foreign relations interests of the Nation as a whole.
Although one might attempt to draw distinctions between diplomatic negotiations with foreign sovereigns and other forms of action, 12 7 or between "proprietary" activity and "regulatory" activity, 128 such distinctions
are unlikely to track the boundaries of the national interest on the international scene. Similarly, distinctions between "private" matters such as
trade and investment, and "public" matters such as environmental, health
and human rights regulation, do not lead to successfully differentiating
between those matters that affect U.S. foreign policy interests and those
that do not.
Ivo Duchacek refers to many of these activities on the part of subnational units of government as "paradiplomacy:"
If by diplomatic negotiation we mean processes by which governments relate their conflicting interests to common ones, there is,
conceptually, no real difference between paradiplomacy and
traditional diplomacy: the aim is to negotiate and implement an
agreement based on considered mutuality. Both sides pledge a
certain mode of future behavior on the condition that the oppo12 9
site side act in accordance with its promise.
124. See Stuart E.Eizenstat, Deputy Treasury Secretary, Testimony Before the
House Banking Committee (Feb. 9, 2000) (on file with author); see also Aegon Singled Out for Criticism On Holocaust Stance, FED. & ST. INS. WK., Feb. 14, 2000, n.p.
125. See Colum Lynch, CaliforniaFaulted On Holocaust Cases; Law's Effect on U.S.
Efforts Decried, WAsii. POST, Dec. 2, 1999, at A35.
126. See generally Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739 (9th
Cir. 2001) (upholding California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act).
127. See Swaine, NegotiatingFederalism, supra note 1, at 1237-45.
128. This approach appears in several areas of constitutional law. See generally
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that
states are subject to laws generally applicable to public and private actors); Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (stating market participant exception in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence).

129. Duchacek, InternationalDimension, supra note 80, at 16.
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If the conduct of diplomacy includes not only the conclusion of agreements but also unilaterally influencing other nations' behavior, then we
may understand almost the entire range of actions described above as
paradiplomacy as well. Accordingly, any project of defining a particular
subcategory of this vast range of activity as being the stuff of "real" foreign
relations is likely to be highly elusive.' - 0 In one way or another, all these
actions, from the promotion of trade and investment opportunities to the
more explicitly "political" initiatives, may implicate the foreign relations
31
interests of the Nation as a whole.1
The pervasive influence that these various actions have on the Nation's foreign affairs, however, cannot be cast only in terms of the potential harm that they inflict. Instead, these initiatives also may have a positive
130. In addition to the acts of paradiplomacy reviewed here, there is a multitude of subnational activity that might not even be directed specifically toward
influencing our Nation's foreign affairs, but that affects our foreign policy nonetheless. One of the classic historical examples is South Carolina's law imprisoning
black seamen, which was not specifically directed at influencing our Nation's foreign policy or the policies of any foreign state. The law violated a U.S.-British
treaty, but the federal government failed to take action to enforce the provisions of
the treaty against the State. Ultimately, Great Britain negotiated with South Carolina and other southern States for a change in policy and the release of British
subjects. See W. BROOKE GRAVEs, AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENrAL RELArIONS 368-69
(1964) (describing South Carolina act that would imprison any black sailors entering its ports). Justice Johnson, riding circuit, opined that these state laws were
unconstitutional, but refrained from entering ajudgment because he thought the
petitioner in the case lacked a remedy. See Elksion v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493,
497 (1823) (No. 4366). Similarly, a host of state taxes and regulations, such as
California's unitary corporate tax and state "buy-American" provisions, have significant international ramifications. See generally Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); see also Brannon P. Denning &Jack H. McCall, Jr., The
Constitutionalityof State and Local "Sanctions"Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State,
States' Affairs, or a Sony State of Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 366-68 (addressing constitutional history of "buy-American" statutes). Less clearly belonging
in this category, although with potential foreign policy implications as well, are the
actions of over 120 cities, which have declared themselves to be nuclear free zones.
See FRY, supra note 68, at 93.
131. Indeed, Crosby illustrates some of these features well. Although ostensibly a procurement decision, it was aimed at addressing an international issue. According to domestic jurisprudence, the state law may actually have overstepped the
bounds of proprietary action, in that it included what was essentially a secondary
boycott. See Alisa B. Klein & Mark B. Stern, Back to First Principles: The Constitutional
Rationalefor InvalidatingLocal Sanctions Against Foreign Trade, 33 LAW & Po'v INT'L
Bus. (forthcoming Fall 2001). Yet this particular feature of Massachusetts' action
was irrelevant to the Supreme Court. And this feature was likely irrelevant to the
alleged GATT (WTO) violation as well. To be sure, the absence of a secondary
boycott would likely have significantly diminished the EU's and Japan's interests in
the matter, but it would not have affected the alleged violation of the GATT
(WTO) agreement. See Christopher McCrudden, InternationalEconomic Law and the
Pursuitof Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective Purchasing Laws Under the WTO Government ProcurementAgreement, 2 J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 3,
23-27 (1999). Finally, although the Massachusetts law led to "diplomatic" contacts
between the state executive and foreign emissaries, unconditional unilateral action
on the part of the State without any willingness to discuss the matter with foreigners would have exercised the objecting parties just the same.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2001], Art. 4

1040

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46: p. 1015

impact on the national foreign policy making process. Perhaps ironically,
this positive impact is more apparent where state and local officials direct
their actions specifically toward the conduct of the Nation's foreign affairs.
By challenging the absence of federal foreign policy on an issue, state and
local actors may raise national awareness of an issue, place issues on the
agenda of federal officials or even induce the federal government to take
action on behalf of the Nation. As the next section will show, in the foreign trade arena the federal government has seized upon some of these
and other benefits of state and local involvement in an effort to turn them
to the advantage of the Nation as a whole.
IV.

FEDERAL INCLUSION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN FOREIGN

POLICY MAKING
Most Administrations in recent times have fostered the rising state
involvement in foreign economic matters described above. 13 2 Similarly,

the Congress has increasingly provided a role for States and their representatives in foreign affairs. This federal hospitality to state participation
represents, in part, a response to States' successful domestic lobbying activities, and, in part, an attempt to draw upon the States for resources, expertise, and strategic political support. These mutually reinforcing aspects of
the federal-state relationship have propelled expanded federal efforts to
include the States in the development of foreign policy in the international economic arena.
For example, the federal government originally included the States in
promoting exports as a means to compensate for resource limitations at
the federal level.1 33 Once President Carter created the standing committee of the National Governors' Association (NGA) on International Trade
and Foreign Relations, 13 4 however, the NGA, the committee and several
other subnational inter-governmental organizations proved to be a formidable congressional lobby with regard to foreign policy initiatives more
generally.' 13 5 The NGA committee in particular capitalized on the experi132. See KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 71 ("Perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, the overall relationship between state and national programs has nevertheless been generally verny cooperative.").
133. See id. at 71 (noting that federal government initiated such state involvement to "help offset financial and other resource limitations" of federal government) (citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE GOVERNMENT CONDUCrED)
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, TECHNICAL STUDY

REPORT 13 (Nat'l Technical Info. Serv. 1977)).
134. See Kincaid, supra note 81, at 103; see also KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT,

supra note 66, at 110.
135. See Kincaid, supra note 81, at 103; see also KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT,
supra note 66, at 43-45 (describing National Association of State Development
Agencies, Federation of Tax Administrators, and Multistate Tax Commission). For
an early description of this trend, see generally DONALD H. HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO WASHINGTON (1974) (discussing nine case studies on local-state
lobbying groups). In recognition of these successes, the federal government has
increasingly sought to preempt state criticism by addressing local concerns about
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ence, knowledge, and connection to business interests that it enjoyed by
virtue of the States' extensive record in export promotion activities. In its
inaugural lobbying victory, it used these resources to shape significantly
13 6
the reform of the Export Administration Act in the late 1970s.
Despite the added power that state lobbying groups derive from federal recognition, Congress and the President have continued to encourage
state participation in foreign affairs by expanding formal channels of subnational participation. In 1984, for example, Congress authorized the creation of what became the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on
Trade (IGPAC) , 37 which the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) promptly
convened "to provide overall policy advice on trade matters that have a
significant relationship to the affairs of state and local governments within
the jurisdiction of the U.S."' "8 IGPAC was created at a time when international trading partners had repeatedly criticized the federal government
for the States' unwillingness to submit to international trade regimes. At
the same time, the United States was about to enter the Uruguay Round
negotiations under the GAT'T, which promised to heighten these concerns. The Uruguay Round would implicate state concerns significantly
more than did previous trade negotiations, 139 and would further
the local ramifications of international agreements. See Charles Tiefer, Free Trade
Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45, 61-63 (1998).
136. See KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 111-16. Only a few years
later, a further prominent episode of significant subnational influence on an issue
of foreign relations occurred when several States, led by California, Alaska, and
Oregon, and assisted by the Multistate Tax Commission and the National Association of Tax Administrators, waged a successful domestic battle to defeat the provision of a U.S.-UK tax treaty that would have restricted the States' use of a particular
method of taxing foreign-owned businesses. See id. at 127-55. The constitutionality
of the Multistate Tax Commission was challenged, unsuccessfully, in the Supreme
Court. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452
(1978).
137. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, ? 306(c) (2) (B) (ii) (3),
98 Stat. 2948 (1984) ("The President... may establish policy advisory committees
representing non-Federal governmental interests."). The legislative history of this
section states, "It is the committee's intention that these intergovernmental advisory committees be established and utilized only in the areas, like insurance or
procurement, where the states have particular interests and not across the broad
spectrum of trade issues." S. REP. No. 98-308, at 49 (1983).

138. CHARTER OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLIcY ADVISORY COMMrIrEE ON
1 1, at http://www.ustr.gov/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2001). The committee

TRADE

consists of thirty to forty appointed representatives of various state and local governmental entities across the Nation. See Matthew Schaefer, Searching for Pareto
Gains in the RelationshipBetween Free Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA, Eying
the fi'AA, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 441, 481 (1997) [hereinafter Schaefer, Pareto Gains]
(discussing creation and role of IGPAC).
139. See David W. Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the

U.S., in

IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND

175, 226 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0.

Sykes eds., 1997) (noting that "for the first time, certain items in the schedules of
commitments impose direct obligations on the states); Matthew Schaefer, TwentyFirst Century Trade Negotiations, the US Constitution, and the Elimination of State-Level
Protectionism, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 71, 76 (1999) [hereinafter Schaefer, State-Level
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strengthen the U.S. commitment to bear responsibility for GATT violations resulting from subnational government action.' 4 0 The States were
accordingly concerned about the agreement, particularly regarding its im14
plications for services and government procurement. '
The IGPAC, however, represented only the beginning of States' inclusion in the process of trade negotiation. Fears about intrusion into state
regulatory autonomy were heightened when, during the Uruguay Round
of negotiations, Canada brought a successful suit against the U.S. before a
GATT tribunal, which declared that the United States had violated its obligations under the agreement by virtue of taxes and other discriminatory
burdens that States had placed on imported alcoholic beverages. 14 2 To
alleviate state concerns that the GAT would infringe on state autonomy,
the Executive Branch specifically included state representatives in the subsequent negotiations of the GATT procurement code and integrated them
into federal decision making regarding the implementation and future development of the GATT agreement. 143 The federal government even negotiated for a limitation of the code to cover only the thirty-seven States
that had declared their willingness to participate. It also worked closely
with the National Association of State Procurement Officers (NASPO) to
lessen the administrative burden that such an agreement would ultimately
place upon the States, and negotiated for the inclusion of an annex listing
specific procurement decisions exempted even in the case of participating
States.1 44 As one commentator put it: "The President was not imposing
international obligations on hapless states. Rather, he was gathering
states' concessions and then, almost as a spokesman for a league of sovereigns, was presenting to other nations what the American states had offered."14 5 Having presumably rejected the political feasibility of simply
exercising its formal powers and forcing all the States to accept the procurement code, the President and Congress decided to work with the
States rather than against them.
Protectionism] (noting that Tokyo Round agreements "impacted states either little
or not at all").
140. See Leebron, supra note 139, at 226 & n.195 (quoting GAT Art.

XXIV:12-14).
141. For a review of the impact of the GATS on state law, see generally Jeffry
Clay Clark, The U.S. Proposalfor a GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services and Its Preemption of Inconsistent State Law, 15 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 75 (1992).
142. See U.S. Tells GA7T"It Will Not Block Adoption of CanadianBeer Report, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 26, at 1083 (June 24, 1992) (reporting that U.S. will not
oppose GATT decision upholding Canadian complaint that U.S. is imposing unfair
duties on Canadian beer).
143. See Leebron, supra note 139, at 228; Schaefer, Pareto Gains, supra note
138, at 472. In 1988 Congress had also added non-federal government representatives to the forty-five-member Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 135, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2155(b)(1). See Leebron, supra note. 139, at 224-31.
144. See Schaefer, Pareto Gains, supra note 138, at 472.
145. Tiefer, supra note 135, at 61.
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The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act further requires the USTR
to keep the States informed, allow for state input, and take the advice of
state representatives into account when developing U.S. policy under the
GATT. 146 Moreover, Congress required that when a foreign government
brings a claim against the United States due to actions of a State, the
USTR should notify that State and allow it to participate in the resolution
of the dispute.1 47 Congress preempted all private causes of action challenging the validity of state laws based on a conflict with the GATT and
consolidated any litigation against a State challenging GATT violations in
the hands of the U.S. Attorney General. 14 8 In a further gesture of conciliation and cooperation, the legislative history notes that litigation on the
part of the Attorney General will be used only "as a 'last resort,"' 149 noting
that the Administration would "cooperat[e]" with the States in the implementation of the agreement. 50 Finally, the USTR must notify, and receive advice from, the States before bringing a complaint before the WTO
against a foreign subnational unit of government. 15 1 To assist in this cooperation with the States, the USTR committed to appointing an official
responsible for coordinating state matters and to working with a state
point of contact in each State.152 Similar provisions govern with regard to
153
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
146. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b) (1) (B) (i)-(iii) (1994). The legislative history further indicates:
[T]he President shall consult with the states, through the intergovernmental trade policy advisory committees established under section 306 of
the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, to achieve conformity of State laws and
practices with the agreements .

. .

. The U.S. Trade Representative

(USTR) shall establish within the Office of the USTR a Federal-State consultation process for addressing issues relating to the agreements that directly relate to, or will potentially have a direct impact on, the states. This
process will include procedures under which (1) the states will be informed on a continuing basis of matters under the agreements that directly relate to, or will potentially have a direct impact on, the State; (2)
the states will be provided an opportunity to submit information and advice to the USTR on a continuing basis concerning these matters; and (3)
the USTR will take into account the information and advice received
from the states when formulating U.S. positions regarding these matters.
H.R. REP. No. 826(I), at reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3795-96.
147. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C).
148. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b) (2) (B) & (c)(1)(A)-(B).
149. 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4013, 4050-54, 140 CONG. REC. H15,036 (1994).
150. Id. at 4029.
151. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (b)(1)(D).
152. See Statement of Administrative Action, 15-16, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4051;
see also Leebron, supra note 139, at 228.
153. With regard to the NAFTA, Congress provided for parallel provisions of
state consultation and protection and here, too, state representatives have attended meetings of committees that had been traditionally closed to representatives of subnational units of government. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312. Some NAFTA
provisions are even more explicit regarding general state consultation. See, e.g.,
19
U.S.C. § 3312(b)(1)(B)(v)(1994) ("[T]he States will be involved (including involvement through the inclusion of appropriate representatives of the states) to
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In 1999, the Clinton Administration's creation of the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Liaison (IAPL) further extended the involvement of state representatives in the formation of national policy on
international economic issues. The IAPL was intended to serve, in part, to
"expand and enhance USTR's partnership with and outreach to state and
local governments" with regard to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreement and the NAFTA. 154 The IAPL coordinates the USTR's outreach to state and local governments (as well as the private sector), working with, among others, the IGPAC, the President's Advisory Committee
on Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), several sectoral advisory bodies, fifty state points of contact designated by the governors' offices of each
State, the National Governors Association, Western Governors Association,
National Conference of State Legislatures, National Association of Attorneys General, and U.S. Conference of Mayors.155 Indeed, several state
representatives have served as official members of U.S. delegations to the
156
WTO ministerial level talks.
Involving the States does not invariably mean giving way to isolationist
pressures. To the contrary, in addition to the extensive international engagement described above, an overwhelming majority of state governors
supported NAFTA, the Uruguay Round Agreements and the President's
"fast-track" authority.' 5 7 Even when the Executive Branch has "imposed" a
the greatest extent practicable at each stage of the development of U.S. positions
regarding matters [under the Agreement that directly relate to, or will potentially
have a direct impact on, the States, and] ... that will be addressed by committees,
subcommittees, or working groups established under the Agreement or through
dispute settlement processes provided for tinder the Agreement."); see also Schaefer, Pareto Gains, supra note 138, at 485-86. Congress also preempted any private
right of action under NAFTA. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c).
154. USTR 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 304, availableat www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/
2000/vii.pdf (providing executive summary of trade policy development). IAPL is
also in charge of outreach to the private sector, which was formally required by the
Trade Act of 1974. IAPL is also in charge of outreach to the private sector, which
was formally required by the Trade Act of 1974. For a discussion of private sector
participation in the formulation of trade policy, see Leebron, supra note 139, at
197-201.
155. See USTR 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 154, at 304-08; see also USTR
Outreach: Trade & State and Local Governments, available at www.ustr.gov/ontreach/
localgovs.html.
156. See USTR 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 154, at 308.
157. FRY, supra note 68, at 108-09. Earlier, however, there had been a significant "Buy American" movement among U.S. state and local legislatures and executives. See KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 87-91. Some courts held
that such laws were unconstitutional tinder Zschernig. See e.g., Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'ns, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221 (1969) ("The California Buy American Act, in effectively placing an embargo on foreign products, amounts to a usurpation by this state of the power of the federal government to conduct foreign
trade policy."). Some later courts, however, were more willing to accept such laws
provided the statutes themselves refrained from discriminating against foreign
trade on the basis of the internal policies of other governments. SeeTrojan Techs.,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 742 F. Supp. 900, 913 (M.D. Pa.), affd 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.
1990) ("The Pennsylvania statute exhibits none of the dangers attendant on the
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National trade policy on the States, it is not infrequently acting as a "mediator" and "broker" among different state interests, with pro-trade States
specifically seeking the assistance of the National government to effectuate
5 8
international trade liberalization.1
Similarly, the NGA did not oppose an international agreement on
government procurement, but instead passed a resolution urging States to
maintain nondiscriminatory purchasing practices that would conform to
the proposed procurement code. 159 States have subsequently registered
concern about the specific form of the agreement, argued for so-called
"grandfather" clauses to exempt existing state legislation and been critical
about the potential for intrusion into state affairs, particularly at the behest of individual litigants.' 60 As a general matter, however, at least as far
as trade is concerned, States are willing to engage and to do so within the
framework of federally negotiated trade agreements. Indeed, a recent
NGA position paper declares: "The U.S. Trade Representative ... should
negotiate new and expand existing trade agreements in an effort to
achieve greater economic prosperity through global free trade." 1 6 1 States'
claims are frequently more about inclusion in, than outright opposition
162
to, federal foreign policy initiatives in the trade area.
statute reviewed in Zschernig,for Pennsylvania's statute provides no opportunity for
state administrative officials or judges to comment on, let alone key their decisions
to, the nattre of foreign regimes."); Amarel v. Connell, 202 Cal. App. 3d 137
(1988); see also Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 55-56 (1st Cir.
1999) (summarizing various state and local initiatives). With the rise of multilateral trade organizations, including NAFTA and the WTO, Congress has preempted
individual claims against state laws that violate those agreements. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 3512(b)(2)(a) & (c). See generally Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the
Water's Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1
(2001).
158. This occurred, for example, when States along the Mexican border
sought implementation of the NAFTA agreement on trucking Mexican goods into
the United States. See Tiefer, supra note 135, at 62-63.
159. See Governors Adopt Resolutions Supporting NAK'TA, GA7T Procurement, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 34, at 1237 (Aug. 21, 1991) (reporting that NGA
reaffirmed support for NAFTA); see also Tiefer, supra note 135, at 61.
160. See 140 CONG. REc. S8853 (daily ed.July 13, 1994); see also Leebron, supra
note 139, at 227-28.
161. Governors' Federal Legislative Prioritiesfor the First Session of the 107th Congress, 2001, Feb. 27, 2001, available at http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/
1,1169,CISSUEBrieg%5ED_1404,00.html.
162. See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 139, at 227 (noting Governor Tommy
Thompson's 1994 demand for state inclusion before the House Way and Means
Committee); National Conference of State Legislatures, Free Trade and Federalism
(July 2000), availableat http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/agtrade.htm; National Governors Association, Governors' Principles on International Trade Policy (adopted as
amended 1999), available at http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/
1,1169,C policy-positionAD_506,00.html; see also KLINE, STATE GOVERNMENT, supra
note 66, at 122 (describing Governors' position regarding access to federal foreign
policy process); id. at 80 (reporting restlts of survey of States' dissatisfaction with
federal trade policy).
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In the context of trade and investment agreements, then, a fruitful
form of cooperation between federal and state actors has emerged. The
States, of course, gain influence by such inclusion in the federal decision
making process, but the federal government benefits as well. By including
the States, the federal government may draw upon State resources, such as
information, experience, or funding, and increase the effectiveness of federal policy development and foreign negotiations. 16 3 Working with state
representatives also allows the federal government to draw upon a network
for gathering political support for federal policies. Indeed the simple fact
of inclusion or exclusion from the policymaking process may become a
powerful tool of persuasion, as was the case with regard to the U.K-U.S.
tax treaty, where States prominently and successfully used their exclusion
from the negotiation process as an argument to lobby against ratification
of the treaty in the Senate. 164 State representatives, such as the NGA, are
also particularly powerful mediators between the federal government and
organized private interests. They are able effectively both to translate local
and business concerns in a manner that does not raise suspicions of selfdealing, 165 and to provide a valuable counterbalance to organized private
pressure at the national level. 166 Finally, given the political significance of
state autonomy in Washington, federal policymakers are keen on developing foreign policies that can count on state support, and state inclusion in
the federal policymaking process is a promising avenue of attaining that
67
goal. '
In short, at least with regard to trade policy, the federal response to
state involvement in foreign affairs has increasingly been to opt for a policy of constructive engagement rather than exclusion. Viewed from the
perspective of state autonomy, this would simply be a welcome fact.
Viewed from the perspective of the national benefits of state involvement,
163. Even beyond trade and investment, this has been true. For example,
States have successfully participated in the negotiation of international wildlife
treaties, where the federal government sought inclusion of the States especially
due to their superior knowledge of implementation issues. See KLINE, STATE GovERNMENT, supra note 66, at 200-04.
164. See id. at 141.
165. See id. at 218.
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Kline, Intergovernmental Tensions, supra note 93, at 110 (noting
federal government's general reluctance to impose direct obligations on state and
local governments in the context of international agreements); id. at II1 (noting
reluctance of federal government to sue States or preempt their sanctions against
South Africa after federal government lifted its sanctions in 1991); Matthew Schaefer, The 'Grey Areas' and 'Yellow Zones' of Split Sovereignty Exposed by Globalization:
Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation, and Intrusion to Escape an Era of
Misguided 'New Federalism, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 65 (1998). The federal government
demonstrated a similar reluctance to intrude on state matters by refraining from
ordering Virginia to postpone the execution of Angel Breard, even though the
execution may well have placed the U.S. in breach of an international agreement.
See Louis Henkin, ProvisionalMeasures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 92 Am.
J. INT'L L. 679, 680-81 (1998).
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however, state engagement and inclusion need not be invariably desirable.
Instead, the question remains how to structure state engagement to harness the positive contributions that state involvement in foreign affairs can
make to the Nation as a whole without generating the disruptive elements
that state participation can produce as well. The next section will put this
question in comparative perspective.
V.

A

COMPARATIVE NOTE ON FEDERALISM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Other federal systems have also struggled with managing a federal dynamic in foreign affairs. The experience of Germany and the European
Union (EU) offers two illustrative examples. Both are divided power systems that have preserved the participation of the various levels of government in the conduct of foreign relations of the political system as a whole.
Both have addressed the tensions between constituent state involvement
and the ultimate need for a coherent foreign policy on the part of the
overall system. And both have developed cooperative arrangements
among central and constituent levels of government in the management
of foreign relations.
In both the EU and in Germany, the problem of foreign affairs federalism has been mitigated by the imposition on various governmental actors of a duty of fidelity to the common enterprise. This may take the
form of a duty of cooperation, involving consultation, joint participation,
or coordination of action in foreign affairs, or it may involve restraint in
action based on a more generalized duty of consideration of the interests
of the overarching political system taken as a whole. The basic idea, which
may be called "fidelity to the union" is the recognition of a duty to make
the common enterprise succeed, and it is one that is deeply embedded in
the jurisprudential theory of each of these systems.";"

A.

Foreign Affairs Federalism in the European Union

The founding treaties of the EU expressly recognize a general duty of
cooperation on the part of the Member States to "facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks." 1 69 This duty serves to fill the gaps when
168. This idea of "fidelity to the union" differs from the related term used to
describe a certain version of constitutional originalism in U.S. constitutional interpretation. See Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalism: U.S. v. Lopez, 1995 Sui'. CT.
REV. 125, 127 ("[I]f conventions in the original context were understood, but not
said, and if they today are neither understood, nor said, then the response of fidelity is to articulate these previously understood conventions, and apply them today
to assure that the constitutional structure original established is, so far as possible,
preserved."); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1365 (1997). In the EU and in Germany, the idea of "fidelity to the Union" is a
broader concept not necessarily linked to the preservation or "translation" of any
original understanding of the founding charter, but rather a mutual duty of interinstitutional and inter-governmental cooperation and respect.
169. Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC or EC Treaty), Nov.
10, 1997, art. 10, O.J. (C 340) 173. The Treaty states:
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Member State obligations are otherwise unclear and ordinary rules of hierarchy and preemption do not suffice to dispose of the tensions between
Member State actions and Union interests. For example, when the EU
passes a directive requiring the Member States to take certain action to
implement EU policy, it generally allows for a period of time before the
directive becomes effective. Although the Member States need not implement the Directive before its date of effectiveness, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) recently invoked Article 10's duty of cooperation to declare
that Member States nonetheless must refrain from taking any affirmative
action that would run contrary to the ultimate objectives of the directive.17 1 Thus, if the EU, for example, issued a directive prohibiting the
hunting of a certain species of wild birds, a Member State that had always
allowed such hunting would not need to limit it until the directive became
effective. A Member State that already had such restrictions in place, however, would be prohibited from lifting the restrictions when the directive is
announced even if that Member State intended to reinstate it when the
directive became effective. The duty of fidelity also informed the ECJ's
holding that where the Community has the exclusive power to regulate a
given subject matter, and has failed to take affirmative action, Member
States retain a residual power to act but in so acting, must heed the interests of the Community and act only as caretakers for the common

interest. 171
In the realm of foreign affairs, fidelity to the Union has played a particularly prominent role, especially in mediating issues of otherwise overlapping or fragmented authority and obligations. First, Member States
must eliminate conflicts between their preexisting international obligations and their obligations under the EU Treaties (since the latter do not,
as matter of EU law, trump the former). 172 Thus, for example, Member
State signatories to the century-old Rhine River accord worked together
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
Id.
This duty is similar to, though not coextensive with, the international law duty of
bona fides ("good faith") in carrying out treaty obligations. See, e.g., Armin von
Bogdandy, Kommentar zu Artikel 5 EGV, in EBERHARD GRABrZ, MCINHARD HILF, DAS
RECHT DER EUROPAISCH EN UNION

(Maastrichter Fassung) (Looseleaf Sept. 1994)

(suggesting difference between duty of cooperation under Article 5, now Article
10, of the EC Treaty, and obligation of bona fides in international law).
170. Case C-129/96, Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v. Region Wallonne, 1997 ECR 1-7411.
171. Case C-804/79, Commission v. United Kingdom (fisheries), 1981 E.C.R.
1045.
172. See EC Treaty art. 307 (formerly art. 234) ("To the extent that such
agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities estab-
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with the European Commission in renegotiating that treaty with Switzerland (the only non-EU member to the accord) in order to remove obstacles to the EU's transportation policies presented by the agreement. 7 ,
Second, Member States must cooperate with one another when exercising
their remaining exclusive powers, such as the power to conduct foreign
74
affairs in areas not covered by the EU Treaties.'
The potential for conflict stemming from federalism in foreign affairs
in the EU is particularly acute because of the incomplete foreign affairs
powers at the central level of government.' 75 EU institutions have the
power to conduct foreign affairs only with regard to specific (albeit rather
broad) areas of substantive policy, while Member States retain the power
over foreign relations with regard to everything else. Thus, only a combination of Member State and EU action will cover the entire field of foreign affairs. 176 This consequence of the vertical division of authority was
evident in the negotiation, ratification, and implementation of the GATT
(WTO) agreements. For example, regarding the negotiation and conclusion of the WTO agreement, the ECJ held that while the Community had
the exclusive power to conclude the GATT portion of that agreement, the
power to conclude the GATS and TRIPs portions of the agreement was
more complicated. 177 Here, the court explained that the EU had the exclusive power to conclude some aspects of these agreements, notably those
pertaining to cross-frontier supplies of services, while the Member States
retained the exclusive power to conclude other aspects of the GATS and
TRIPs, notably those portions dealing with consumption abroad, commercial presence of foreign subsidiaries, and entry of natural persons from
WTO countries. The ECJ consequently held that the GATS and TRIPs
portions of the WTO agreement must be signed not only by the EU or by
its fifteen Member States individually, but by all sixteen parties: the EU
plus its Member States.
The case arose after the negotiations had been completed, but before
the treaty had been formally concluded. The European Commission had
appealed to the ECJ for a ruling in favor of sole Community jurisdiction,
lished. Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and
shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude.").
173. Opinion 1/76 (Laying-up ftnd), 1977 E.C.R. 741.
174. Case C-22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), 1971 E.C.R. 263.
175. For a broad comparative perspective on the divided foreign affairs system of the European Community, see Joseph H. H. Weiler, The External Legal Relations of Non-Unitay Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle, in MIXED AGREEMENTS

(David O'Keefe & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1983).
176. Although in some cases the treaty allows for the ad hoc expansion of
exclusive responsibility by a majority vote of the Member States, the general fragmentation of foreign affairs powers persists. See Sophie Metmnier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU, 37 J.
COMMON MKr. STruD. 477 (1999).

177. Opinion 1/94 (Uruguay Round Treaties), 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267, 1 C.M.L.R.
205 (1995).
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in part to avoid such joint negotiations in the future. Most important, the
Commission sought to avert problems that might arise in the administration of the agreement if the Community and the Member States were to
share competence to conclude the GATS and TRIPs. The court, however,
dismissed this concern, relying on the duty of cooperation to require that
the various actors solve any such problems in a harmonious fashion. As
the court noted, the various actors were under an obligation to cooperate
not only in the negotiation and conclusion of the agreement, but also in
the implementation of the agreement. For example, if the EU needed to
take action (either to maintain its obligations or to retaliate against unfair
trade practices of third party signatories), and such action required combined efforts covering areas subject to the Member State's exclusive jurisdiction, the Member States, according to the ECJ, would have to oblige.
Cooperation is thus viewed as essential to combat the problems of otherwise fragmented power in the conduct of foreign affairs. As the European
Court ofJustice explained: "Th[e] obligation to cooperate flows from the
requirement of unity in the international representation of the
Community."1 78
B.

Foreign Affairs Federalism in Germany

In contrast to its European analogue, the German principle of
Bundestreue (or "federal fidelity") does not appear in the text of the German Grundgesetz (GG)which is Germany's modern constitution. The idea,
however, goes back at least to the German Constitution of 1871 and was
elaborated during the early part of this Century by Rudolf Smend. 17 Despite its lack of a textual foundation, the earliest decisions of modern Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) relied on
this concept, declaring federal fidelity to be a basic legal and justiciable
principle requiring both affirmative cooperation and restraint whenever
the common interest so demands.1 80
178. Id. 1 108. Similarly, with regard to the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, which is governed by the Treaty on European Union as opposed to the
Treaty on European Community, Member States are required to "support the
Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty
and mutual solidarity." Treaty on European Union art. 11. In addition, "Member
States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity.
They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union
or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations."
Id.
179. See Rudolf Smend, Ungeschriebenes Verfassungsrecht im Monarchischen
Bundesstaat, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR OTTO MAYER 247 (1916). For a treatment of
Smend's reception in German constitutional theory, see STEFAN KORIOTH, INTEGRATION UND BUNDESSTAAT: EIN BEITRAG ZUR STAATS-UND VERFASSUNGSLEHRE RUDOLF
SMENDS (Duncker & Humblot eds., 1990).
180. See generally, DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 77-80 (1994); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRU-

DENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 69-90 (2d ed. 1997); STEFAN OETER,
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The idea of federal fidelity has been prominently developed as a reciprocal obligation on the part of the Federation (namely, the federal institutions of government) and the Ldnder (Germany's constituent states).
For example, the Constitutional Court further objected to the Federation's creation of a television station not only because the action was beyond the Federation's authority to regulate the technical aspects of
television frequency distribution and intruded into cultural matters, which
are reserved to the Ldnder, but also because the Federation had violated
the principle of fidelity by failing to consult with all the Ldnder before
taking federal action. 18 1 The Constitutional Court further illustrated the
symmetry of this principle in the context of foreign affairs, by holding that
the principle requires the Ldnder to consider the Federal Republic's international obligations when exercising their reserved powers, and that the
Federation, in turn, must consult with the States before taking on obligations under international law whenever such obligations implicate the re182
served powers of the Ldnder.
Germany has recently reconsidered the question of how to preserve
federalism in foreign affairs in the context of European Union matters.
Here, the potential for conflict is particularly acute, because EU issues are
formally considered foreign affairs matters and were thus, according to
the German Grundgesetz, an exclusive prerogative of the federal government. In reality, however, EU affairs have long swept as broadly and penetrated as deeply as most any domestic policy agenda, thereby implicating
many of the reserved powers of the Ldnder. Policy domains implicating
the Ldnder's reserved powers had shifted away from the Ldnder legislatures,
and away from the German federal legislature in which the Lander executives were at least directly represented, 18 3 to the EU level where Germany
was represented solely through its national Executive Branch
Bundesregierung. Germany consequently had experienced difficulty in implementing EU matters pertaining to the reserved powers of the Lander.
To resolve this tension, the Grundgesetz was amended in 1994 formally to
include the Lander in the EU decision-making process and, at the same
time, to affirm their duty to implement European directives.' 8 4 Article 23
GG now provides for a creative new scheme for Germany's representation
in the EU, and a prominent role for the constitutional duty of cooperation
in foreign affairs.
In its new version, Article 23 GG expressly guarantees that, as a general matter, in European Union affairs, "[t]he Bundesrat shall participate
213-229 (Mohr
Siebeck ed., 1998).
181. 12 BVerfGE 205, 254-56 (1961).
182. See 92 BverfGE 203 (1995); 6 BverfGE 309, 360-61 (1957).
183. The Landerexecutives sit in the, German Bundesrat. See Art. 50 GG.
INTEGRATION UND SUBSIDIARITAT IM DEUTSCHEN BUNDESSTAATSRECHT

184. See generally Daniel Halberstam, ComparativeFederalismand the Issue of Com-

mandeering,in THE

FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE

US AND THE EU 213, 242-244 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).
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in the decision-making process of the Federation insofar as the corresponding domestic decision would have involved [the Bundesrat] or insofar as the Ldnder would have had authority over the issue as a domestic
matter."' 8 5 More specifically, Article 23 spells out three degrees of Ldnder
involvement:
[1] Insofar as within matters of exclusive competence of the Federation, the interests of the Landerare affected, or the Federation
otherwise has legislative power, the Federal Government must
consider the position of the Bundesrat. [2] When the legislative
powers, structure of agencies, or administrative procedures of the
Lander are primarily affected, the Federation shall consider the
Bundesrat's position as being decisive; in doing so, the responsibility of the Federation for the state as a whole is to be
heeded. .

.

. [3] When the exclusive legislative powers of the

Ldnder are primarily affected, the Federation shall delegate the
exercise of the rights that the Federal Republic of Germany holds
as a member of the European Union to a representative of the
Lander designated by the Bundesrat. The rights are exercised with
the participation and agreement of the Federal Executive; in doing so, the responsibility of the Federation for the state as a
whole is to be heeded.

186

According to reports evaluating these procedures, the coordination
among the Federation and the Ldnder has worked reasonably well.1 87 The
Federal Government has welcomed, and indeed fostered, the transfer of
the powers of representation to a Lander representative, and the Lander
representatives have successfully carried out their task of representing Germany in the EU Council.' 8 8 The involvement of Lander representatives
appears not to have led to obstructionism on the part of Germany's
Lander. For instance, the Ldnder were willing to compromise on the issue
RIE,

185. Article 23 GG (as translated by author in consultation with DAVID P. CURTIE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1994) and the In-

ternational Constitutional Law website located at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/
law/gm00000_.html).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Gerd Blume & Alexander Graf von Rex, Weiterentwicklung der
Inhaltlichen und Personellen Mitwirkung der Ldnder in Angelegenheiten der EU nach
Maastrichi, in

EUROPAPOLITIK

DER LXNDER:

BILANZ

UND

PERSPEKTIVEN NACH DEM

29, 42 (Franz H.U. Borkenhagen ed., 1998) (noting positive cooperation during the 1996 European Intergovernmental Conference); RALF

GIPFEL VON AMSTERDAM

353 (1999) (noting generally positive evaluation of cooperation process by participants); Lars von Dewitz,
Der Bundesrat - Bilanz der Arbeit im EU Auscchu4 seit 1992, in EUROPAPOLITIK DER
LANDER, supra (noting specific instances of successful cooperation); Georg-Berndt
Oschatz & Horst Risse, Die Bundesregierungan der Kette der Ldnder?, 1995 DAS OFFENTLICHE RECHT 437, 552 (noting that predicted difficulties have not been borne out

MCJLLER-TERPITZ, BUNDESRAT UND EUROPAISCHE UNION

in practice).
188. von Dewitz, supra note 187, at 79-80.
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of EU local emergency measures, even though the Ldnder had initially
charged that the proposed legislation exceeded the bounds of subsidiary
enshrined in the Treaty.1

89

Germany thus has renewed its commitment to federalism in policy
arenas with particular significance to its Ldnder, despite the fact that this
domain has moved to the European Union level of governance and thus
formally belongs to the realm of foreign affairs. The Constitution sets
forth a detailed scheme for Ldnder involvement, and a duty of fidelity to
the union tempers the potentially differing interests of the various institutional actors by committing them to heed the interests of the nation as a
whole in exercising their respective powers.
C.

Lessons for the United States: What Positive Role for the States?

Both the EU and Germany thus view the inclusion of constituent
levels of governance as beneficial to the conduct of the overall system's
foreign affairs. Both the EU and Germany have preserved a vertical division of powers, have formally included component units of government in
the conduct of foreign affairs, and have required the various levels of government to cooperate in fulfillment of a constitutional duty of fidelity to
the union. The following comparative discussion will consider whether
heightened forms of federal-state cooperation are suitable for the United
States, or whether other lessons for the United States may be drawn from
this comparison.
In discussing the benefits of including the States in foreign affairs or
imposing upon them a duty of cooperation with federal institutions of governance, it may be useful to distinguish between three different kinds of
inclusion and cooperation. First is the idea of surrogacy. According to
this view, the component states take action that the federal government
would have taken, but cannot take itself. This dynamic permeates the basic structures of the EU and Germany. In each system the central government is incomplete in the sense that it cannot rely on a full array of
legislative, judicial, and executive powers. The nuances of the central government's lack of power are different in the EU and in Germany, but in
each system the central bureaucracy is relatively weak and must rely upon
component units of government for assistance in virtually all aspects of
governance.190 As the brief sketch of EU and German foreign policy powers demonstrated, here, too, those central governments lack a full complement of authority to govern. Under these circumstances, the component
states' participation in governance fulfills a positive function for the nation as a whole, but it is a function that frequently does not add much
beyond cost-sharing or making up for inadequate powers at the central
189. See generalty id.
190. See generally, Halberstam, supra note 184.
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level of governance.1 9 1 To the extent that component states participating
in governance must act as surrogates, their participation does not enrich
the federal perspective. Such participation, then, is unlikely to further the
national interest unless the central government is unable to act. Given
that the United States is competent to act comprehensively with regard to
foreign affairs,' 92 imposing a background requirement that States act as
surrogates thus makes little sense.
At the other end of the spectrum is the vision of cooperation as a
search for consensus prior to action. Involving component states in such a
process substantially affects the policies adopted, and thus, to the extent
that component states offer a distinct and valuable perspective, such inclusion would be beneficial to the national interest. Moreover, consensus
may add legitimacy, as Hamilton noted when arguing for including the
Senate as a check on the President's exercise of the treaty power. 193 The
general cost of consensus, however, is inefficiency of decision making and
a strong bias in favor of the status quo. As Hamilton famously stated in
191. In Germany, for example, this distinction may be seen when comparing
Lfinder activity tinder Articles 83, 86 and 75 GG. Under Articles 83 and 86 GG, the
Linder act as surrogates of the federal government, in that they administer federal
policies without substantive input. This is dramatically the case with regard to Article 86 GG, tinder which the Linder carry out Federation policy "as agents of the
Federation," although even under Article 83 GG, according to which the Ldnder
carry out Federation policy "as a matter of their own concern," the Ldnder enjoy
only a modicum of control over the administrative procedures regarding the policy
implementation. Only under Article 75 GG, which authorizes the Federation to
pass framework legislation that the Linder must flesh out with their own laws, do
the Liinderexercise meaningful discretion in acting pursuant to federal norms. See
generally, Halberstam, supra note 184. See aLso 2-3 HORST DREIER, GRUNDGESETZ
KOMMEN'rAR ARTS. 75, 83, 86 (1996). Although all three forms of participation are
beneficial to the governance of the federal system, Liinder assistance under Articles
83 and 86 GG could be obviated by enlarging the federal bureaucracy. Only the
Article 75 GG mechanism of framework legislation adds a distinct subnational perspective that could not otherwise be obtained. A similar difference exists in the
EU when comparing regulations and detailed directives with so-called "framework
directives," which are intended to leave the implementing Member State considerable latitude in filling the general Community norm with member state specific
content. See Halberstam, supra note 184, at 230-34.
192. 1 put to one side the debate surrounding potential limitations on the
federal government's treaty power. See Bradley, Treaty Power, supra note 1; Golove,
Treaty Making, supra note 1, at 1076-77 (summarizing various positions within
scholarly discourse).
193. With regard to making treaties, Hamilton conceded the wisdom of including at least the Senate as a check on the President's exercise of power. TiHE
FEDERALIST No. 75, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Hamilton stated:
The qualities elsewhere detailed, as indispensable in the management of
foreign negotiations, point out the executive as the most fit agent in
those transactions; while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or
a part of the legislative body in the office of making them.
Id. For treatment of the Senate's role in this balance, see Ackerman & Golove,
supra note 1; Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously, supra note 1.
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arguing for a strong executive and against involvement of the large and
varied House of Representatives in the treaty making process: "Decision,
activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings
of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any
greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qual1 94
ities will be diminished."
This difficulty of weighing the cost of inefficiency against the added
legitimacy of inclusion persists into the present. 195 As Fritz Scharpf has
noted with regard to EU and German decision making, cooperative arrangements requiring unanimity may lead to an inefficient 'joint decision
trap," which skews decisions by generally curtailing the ability to take action, as well as by occasionally inducing actions that appear cheaper than
they are by virtue of the participation of the other party.196 To be sure, in
the foreign affairs context, "inefficiency" may sometimes serve strategic
purposes. 19 7 Yet the greater the autonomy of central decision makers is
194. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 506-07 (invoking similar argument against inclusion of the House in formation of treaties).
195. See, e.g., Giovanni Sartori, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING:
AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES (1994) (propounding
merits of "winner-take-all" electoral system); Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman,
Choosing an Electoral System, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984) (arguing for greater legitimacy of proportional representation).
196. See Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism
and European Integration, 36 LAw & ST. 1 (1987). See generally, Fritz W. Scharpf,
Theorie der Politikverflechtung, in SCHARPF ET AL., POLITIKVERFLECHTUNG: THEORIE
UND EMPIRIE

DES KOOPERATIVEN

F'5DERALISMUS

IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK

13-70

(1976).
197. See, e.g., Frederick W. Mayer, ManagingDomestic Differences in International
Negotiations: The Strategic Use of InternalSide-Payments, 46 INT'L ORG. 793, 796 (1992)
("Having one's hands tied can be quite useful in extracting concessions from an
opponent in negotiation. U.S. negotiators, for example, have long used the threat
of congressional rejection as a device for leveraging concessions at the bargaining
table."); Putnam, supra note 65, at 449 ("[T]wo level analysis... implies that, ceteis
paribus, the stronger a state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressures, the
weaker its relative bargaining position internationally"). An example of this phenomenon can be found in the maneuverings of the United States and European
Community and its Member States after the breakdown of talks during the Hague
Conference on Climate change in November, 2000. The U.S. sought to change
the means for gauging fulfillment of treaty commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, to the opposition of the EU. John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, brokered an eleventh-hour compromise between the EU delegation and that of the United States. While the parties, as well as Mr. Prescott, initially believed they had reached an agreement, intra-European discord ultimately
destroyed the deal. See Stephen Fidler & Vanessa Houlder, Hague Talks Ministers
Rally Behind French Colleague: 'No Agreement Better than a Bad Agreement' Say Portuguese, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 28, 2000, at 17. But see Andrew C. Revkin, Odd
Culprits in Collapse of Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at F1 (blaming both
sides for Hague failure). Due to the inefficiency of its internal decision making,
the EU was thus able to preserve its initial policy decision, albeit at the cost of
sacrificing an international agreement that would have included the United States.
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from their component state constituents, the larger the set of agreements

that they might reach internationally, and the quicker they can respond to
pressing issues."' The EU has had much experience with such cooperation, both in the case of actual treaty negotiation and implementation, as
well as in the case of more general foreign policy making. 1" ' The requirement of unanimity for reaching decisions in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for example, became the subject of widespread criticism
in connection with the EU's response to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. 2t 0 As a result, the Amsterdam Treaty lessened the need for cooperation under the CFSP so that individual Member States could, to a certain
2 1
degree, opt out of EU-wide foreign and security policies. 0
We should clearly be reluctant, then, to take lightly any broad based
unanimity requirement as a precondition for taking action in the foreign
policy arena. Extending the federal-state consultation process to require
unanimity before exploring any further trade liberalization, for example,
will slow down the development of further international agreements. An
individual state veto may do so even if trade liberalization would be in the
interests of the Nation as a whole. More generally, requiring consent at
every step along the way introduces a certain path dependence that will
further hamper reaching international agreements that may be beneficial
2 2
to the Nation. 0
Problems similar to those attending a unanimity requirement across
constituent states, or among constituent states and the central government, may afflict policymaking conducted exclusively by the central government, particularly if conducted by a single large foreign policy
bureaucracy. The same is true where authority for action is lodged in
Congress, as Hamilton recognized long ago. If this is so, however, then
the most significant contribution that States may make in their foreign
198. See, e.g., Putnam, supra note 65, at 449.
199. See generally, Peter L. H. Van den Bossche, The European Community and
the Uruguay Round Agreements, in IMPLEMENTING TH-IE URUGUAY ROUND 66-69 (John
H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997). This experience in the foreign affairs
arena mirrored the experience of the Community in domestic legislation where
unanimity was widely required for any policy decision prior to the Single European
Act. See generallyJoseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE. L.J.
2403 (1991) (tracing history of unanimity requirement in EU).
200. See generally PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAw: TEx'r, CASES,
39 (1998). See also William Bradford, The Western European Union,
Yugoslavia, and the (Dis)Integration of the EU, The New Sick Man of Europe, 24 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 13 (2000).
AND MATERIALS

201. See Treaty on European Union art. 23 (allowing Member States to issue
formal declaration of dissent from EU policy, while noting that policy would still
bind Union and that Member State would refrain from any actions that undermine
policy).
202. In part, this is the idea behind creating "fast-track" authority, that is,
preventing individual interests from voting down separate aspects of a trade liberalization package that, taken as a whole, will be in the interests of all. For a discussion of the history and development of "fast-track" authority, see Leebron, supra
note 139 at 177-86.
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policy initiatives, is helping the Nation to overcome this institutional
inertia.
Between the poles of surrogacy and consensus, then, lies a third conception of "cooperation," imposed only in the ultimate outcome, but not
along the way. The idea is that when States take actions, such as the recent
initiatives surrounding the settlement of Holocaust claims, they provoke
federal government action where such action may otherwise not have
been forthcoming. It is far from clear that preserving the federal policy
vacuum by a constitutional rule of state exclusion would have served the
Nation as a whole, as some have argued. 203 To the contrary, the fact that
these settlements were ultimately pursued by federal negotiators, and publicly brought to a successful resolution with the apparent approval of the
relevant national authorities, suggests that the States were not imposing
any unjustified, sectoral interests on the Nation as a whole. Yet, this resolution may not have happened had it not been for the state regulators'

initiative. More generally, then, domestic minorities (whether they be
States or interest groups within States) may bring issues to the foreign relations table and ultimately win national support for them after the issue has
9°4
run through the process of international bargaining and agreement.
Requiring consensus at every step along the way, as well as excluding the
States entirely, may hinder the emergence of an outcome preferred by all.
In other words, the most significant benefit of constituent state involvement in foreign affairs is the ability to bring issues onto the national
agenda that would otherwise lay dormant due to the inertia of decision
makers within the national policy making bureaucracy. The benefit of
state involvement in foreign affairs is neither mimicking the Nation as a
whole, nor in reaching consensus at every step along the way, but in challenging the Nation to action.
VI.

DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSITvE ROLE FOR THE STATES

Recognizing such a benefit in state participation in foreign affairs

clearly suggests a rejection of the categorical exclusion developed in
Zschernig. Two further doctrinal consequences follow, however, from recognition of this positive state role: first, a rule of non-discrimination, and
second, a rejection of any presumption regarding federal preemption and
a concern for the preservation of positive federal policy.
The first rule is simple. Focusing on the national interest in state involvement in foreign affairs, a State's voice that seeks unfairly to advance
its own interests to the inevitable detriment of its sister States would have
little value. Inevitably, it will lead to disharmony and strife, and should be
203. See, e.g., Swaine, Foreign Relations Law, supra note 1, at 504.
204. For example, policy options may be created through international en-

gagement that would not otherwise exist, thus altering the domestic political dynamic in favor or against any particular outcome. See Putnam, supra note 65, at
447. If foreign engagement always depends on domestic consensus, these additional policy options might remain unexplored.
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presumed to be against the national interest unless proven to be otherwise
by affirmative action of the federal political branches. The obligation of
one component state not to discriminate against one's sister states in foreign policy issues is nicely illustrated by the European case surrounding
the draft agreement for an insurance fund for waterway vessels on the
Rhine and Moselle. 20 5 The European Community lacked the authority to
negotiate the necessary changes in the Rhine and Moselle river accords for
the creation of the fund. Accordingly, the six Member States who were
parties to those two agreements undertook the necessary negotiations with
Switzerland, the only non-Member State party to the two accords. Although the participation of the six Member States in the external negotiations were thus justified in principle; the outcome was not. As the court
described the flaws in the draft agreement,
[T]here are various groupings of those who are either given
rights or placed under duties; sometimes all the Member States
of the Community and Switzerland .... sometimes the Member
States, with one exception, and Switzerland ....
sometimes the
Community as such and Switzerland . . . and sometimes five

States to which a special function is reserved in the decision-making process [of the resulting supervisory body] .20
In the court's view, this unevenness in rights and obligations was unacceptable, as it "alter[ed] in a manner inconsistent with the [EC] Treaty the
relationships between Member States."20 7 The court held that the draft
agreement could not be concluded because it was "not compatible with
20 8
the requirements of unity and solidarity."
United States Supreme Court decisions have imposed a similar nondiscrimination requirement on state activity in foreign affairs, although
the context in which these cases arose has so far been largely limited to
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As in dormant Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence,119 the Court has prohibited discrimination
in deciding dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases as well. In Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 2"1 for example, the Court moved beyond the formal
inquiry whether the tires and tubes that were subject to a state property
tax were "imports." Instead, the Court took a more functional approach,
205. Opinion 1/76 (Laying-up Fund), 1977 ECR 741.
206. See id. at 757, 9.
207. Id. at 757, § 10. The Court also noted that the supervisory board appeared to shift power away from the Community and toward the participating
Member States. See id. at 757
9-10.
208. Id. at 758, 1 12.
209. See generally Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce
Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554 (1995)
[hereinafter Regan, How to Think About the FederalCommerce Power]; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MicHi. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
210. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
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examining whether the tax contravened the policies behind the constitutional provisions at issue. 2 ' I The Court identified one of these policies as
an effort to preserve "harmony among the States[, which] might be disturbed unless seaboard States ... were prohibited from levying taxes on

citizens of other States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports
to the other States not situated as favorably geographically." 2 1 2 In other
words, States could not exploit their geographic monopoly with regard to
the necessary flow of trade across its borders in a manner that would harm
the interests of its sister States. The Court found that a nondiscriminatory
ad valorem property tax, however, "unlike discriminatory state taxation
against imported goods as imports, was not regarded as an impediment
that severely hampered commerce or constituted a form of tribute by seaboard States to the disadvantage of the other States."2 13 Moreover, such a
tax reflected nothing else than the desire of the State to require the importer who, along with others doing business in the State, was a benefici2 14
ary of state services, to pay a fair share for the benefits thus conferred.
Currently, however, the Court's decisions in the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause area go well beyond this basic idea of ensuring that
state actions with foreign affairs implications are "fair" to their sister
States' interests. With regard to state taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce, for example, the Court makes two additional inquiries.
The first examines the "enhanced risk of multiple taxation," and the second asks whether the tax "may impair federal uniformity in an area where
federal uniformity is essential." 215 Although the latter inquiry, properly
understood, is justified from the national interest perspective on state participation in foreign affairs, the former is not.
For example, in Japan Line, which involved a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax on cargo containers, the Court explained that
whereas domestically, apportionment could serve to guard against the
dangers of multiple taxation, in the international context apportionment
was insufficient to prevent multiple taxation. 2 16 In the Court's view, the
Court itself as well as the national political branches could, with regard to
211. Although the challenge was brought principally under the Import/Export Clause, U.S. CONST. Article I, Section 10, Clause 2, the Court drew on dormant Foreign Commerce Clause analysis as well.
212. Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 285-86.
213. Id. at 286.
214. See id. at 288-89. The Court's reasoning in this case bears resemblance to
its decisions in transportation cases under the dormant Commerce Clause. See,
e.g.,
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). Its inquiry also
strongly resembled the Court's dormant Interstate Commerce Clause analysis,
which asks whether a tax "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto
Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
215. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434, 446, 448
(1979).
216. See id.at 448.
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domestic taxes, ultimately step in and ensure that each taxing authority
fairly apportioned its share of taxes. When one of the taxing authorities is
a foreign government, in contrast, this would be impossible. In JapanLine,
the state tax resulted in actual multiple taxation, because California taxed
certain shipping containers in part, while Japan taxed them in full. The
Court could prevent such multiple taxation only by prohibiting California's partial (and arguably fair) state tax. In other words, as soon as a
foreign state taxes an aspect of foreign commerce that might otherwise be
subject to a fair state tax within the United States, the Court, under this
rule, would ascribe exclusive domestic taxing power to Congress.
The Court's goal here is the eradication of multiple taxation of foreign commerce, since such taxation makes foreign commerce relatively
more expensive than domestic (interstate) commerce. Such an uncompromising goal, however, does not square with the Court's domestic jurisprudence, where the Court has upheld fairly apportioned state taxes even
when they create a real risk of multiple taxation. 2 17 In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,2 18 for example, the Court upheld an apportionment
formula by one State, even though other States were using a different apportionment formula, and even though the use of such differing formulas
would almost certainly lead to multiple taxation. Although the threat of
multiple taxation may indeed be a legitimate concern, a State need only
act fairly to fulfill its constitutional duty to avoid such excessive burdens to
interstate commerce. If multiple taxation should be eradicated entirely,
the Court ought not to tolerate such multiple taxation in the domestic
context either. 219 And if fairness guides the analysis of taxation of instru°
mentalities of interstate commerce domestically, 2 21
then States should be
able to prod the federal government into action by adopting a taxing
scheme with international implications as long as they are being "fair" to
their sister States here as well.
217. Even though the Court's domestic dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence may demonstrate a concern about multiple taxation, the Court stopped
short of prohibiting multiple taxation entirely and required only that States impose taxes that are "fairly apportioned." Cf Regan, How to Think About the Federal
Commerce Power, supra note 209, at 612-14 (arguing that Court's "fair apportionment" jurisprudence under dormant Interstate Commerce Clause is justified by
concern about multiple taxation).
218. 437 U.S. 267, 277 (1978).
219. The Court subsequently held that it accepts the possibility of multiple
taxation in both contexts, but it has presented this as an exception to the general
rule whenever the multiple taxation was not the "inevitable result" of the tax and
where the "alternatives reasonably available" to the State did not eliminate the risk
of multiple taxation. See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 318-319
(1994); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 188-89, 191 (1983).
220. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184
(1995) ("The difficult question in this case is whether the tax is properly apportioned within the meaning of the second prong of Complete Auto's test, 'the central
purpose [of which] is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction."') (citation omitted).
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The Court's second additional inquiry (whether the state law "may
impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential")
coincides with the second doctrinal rule that I would like to explore here:
the rejection of presumptions regarding preemption and a strong commitment to the preservation of positive federal policy. If we abandon the inherently skeptical view of state participation in foreign affairs, and we
recognize that such state activity may benefit the Nation as a whole, it is
difficult to make any assumptions about the likely intent of federal policymakers regarding preemption, and the main goal of preemption analysis
becomes the vigorous protection of positive federal policy.
Expressing this simply as a rejection of presumptions regarding preemption, as some scholars have argued, 22 1 is, however, incomplete. The
metaphor of an evidentiary "presumption," or lack thereof may mean several things. First, it may refer to the default rule at the outset of the litigation, that is, declaring a winner when no relevant facts are proven, or to a
"tie-breaker" that determines the outcome in those rare cases in which the
evidence leaves the decision maker in equipoise. Used in this sense of a
"litigation presumption," as one might call it, a presumption against preemption is a basic feature of our federal system in which state authority is
general and federal power enumerated and particular. 222 Without a showing that federal law preempts state law, the state law will stand. And
should the rare case arise in which a judge is genuinely in equipoise regarding the federal political branches' intent concerning preemption, the
state law will prevail as well. A presumption, however, may alternatively
(albeit relatedly) denote a substantive default conclusion about the evidence, an assumption regarding the likelihood of a given evidentiary conclusion, or even a systematic bias coloring the interpretation of all the
evidence received. 223 Understood in this "evidentiary" sense, a "presumption against preemption," for example, might assume that Congress did
not intend to preempt the States unless proven otherwise, that Congress is
generally unlikely to have intended to displace the States, or that we are
indeed so skeptical about any claim of preemption that interpretations
suggesting Congress had the intent to preempt the States are disfavored
whenever there are other minimally plausible constructions of the evidence. This evidentiary presumption against preemption may be based on
221. See generally Goldsmith, Statutory ForeignAffairs Preemption, supranote 1; see
also Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, ConcurrentJurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs
Exception, 69 GEO. WAsri. L. REV. 139, 172 (2001). For a helpful discussion of the
"presumption against preemption" and the view that the Supremacy Clause was
intended to abolish any such presumption, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption,86 VA. L.
REV.

225 (2000).
222. Cf Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 1, at 201.
223. Although a litigation presumption would tend to go hand in hand with

an evidentiary presumption, the two are analytically distinct. One might believe
that one party or another should win absent any facts being adduced, or that the
tie should go to one party or another, without thereby making any corresponding
substantive claims about the likely interpretation of the evidence itself.
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the view that States have traditionally regulated in this area and that the
federal government is unlikely to have intended their displacement absent
careful consideration of the issue. Conversely, an evidentiary presumption
in favor of preemption might be based on the idea that Congress is likely
to view state action in the foreign policy arena as trouble for the Nation.
Professor Goldsmith, who has recently argued for rejecting presumptions regarding preemption (at least in the foreign affairs context), is invoking this evidentiary sense of "presumption," that is, he rejects making
substantive assumptions about what the federal political branches intended (or are likely to have intended), as well as harboring a systematic
bias in favor of the States in the interpretive project as a whole. He agrees
with the litigation presumptions that the State should win unless it is
proven that federal law preempts, and that the State should also win in the
rare case in which the facts concerning the federal policymakers' intent
leave a court in equipoise. Beyond that, however, he urges judges to "perform preemption analysis without recourse to the presumptive cannons."22 4 As Goldsmith notes, because the evidentiary presumption
against preemption (in matters of traditional state concern) faces an opposing evidentiary presumption in favor of preemption (in matters pertaining to foreign affairs), and because foreign affairs increasingly will
overlap with matters of traditional state concern, "the competing pre'225
sumptions against and for preemption lose coherence and usefulness.
Abandoning evidentiary presumptions and systematic interpretive biases in favor or against the States in examining the federal policymaker's
intent regarding preemption makes sense from the perspective of the national benefits of state participation in foreign affairs as well. From this
perspective, state action as a means to goad the federal government to
action has fulfilled its beneficial role for the Nation once the federal policymaker has considered the issue. At the same time, however, continued
state action may also be supportive of federal policy, and thus Congress
should not be presumed to have excluded the States simply by virtue of
acting. Accordingly, the only relevant question is whether the federal political branches have truly spoken to the issue raised by the States and
whether the federal policy envisions a continued role for the States.
Rejecting these evidentiary presumptions regarding preemption, however, still leaves open questions about actually weighing the evidence.
Even absent initial assumptions about the conclusions to be drawn and
without any bias skewing the inquiry in a particular direction, indications
of the federal policymaker's intent to preempt or preserve state participation in a given foreign policy matter may be weighed quite differently. At
one extreme, seemingly minor expressions of intent (to preempt or preserve state action) might be minimized or discounted while more compelling evidence is sought; that is, a court might display considerable
224. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, supra note 1, at 200.
225. Id. at 197.
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hesitance to drawing any conclusion from scanty evidence regarding intent. Alternatively, such small indications of the federal policymaker's
likely intent might be magnified and taken as sufficient to indicate an authoritative federal policy decision on the matter.
This is where the Court's approach evinces an eagerness to preserve
positive federal policy (which is not, however, synonymous with a bias in
favor of displacing the States). Once the federal policymaker has spoken
to the issue, the Court demonstrates great solicitude towards the federal
policy decision. In weighing the evidence regarding the federal policymaker's intent to preempt or preserve state law, the Court is willing to
act on implications and seize upon rather subtle indications of intent.
This heightened sensitivity to discerning what may lie beneath the formal
promulgation of the federal policy, may work in the State's favor as well as
against it. In short, in weighing the evidence regarding positive preemption, the Court's foreign policy lens magnifies implications of both preemption and preservation of state law.
On closer inspection, several of the Court's cases regarding "federal
uniformity" and the maintenance of "one voice," bear this approach out.
For example, we see this heightened interest in preserving positive federal
policy already in Michelin Tire, which noted as an additional reason for
upholding the nondiscriminatory state tax that it did not threaten U.S.
policy. 2 26 The state tax did not challenge the federal government's exclu-

sive ability to regulate foreign commerce, because the tax could not "be
applied selectively to encourage or discourage any importation in a manner inconsistent with federal regulation." 227 Michelin Tire thus shifted the
focus not only toward the practical effect of the tax in terms of achieving
interstate harmony, but also to whether it stood in tension with federal
policies.
Even more to the point is Japan Line. More important than the threat
of multiple taxation discussed above, is the theme of uniformity and the
doctrine of "'speaking with one voice' in regulating foreign trade." 228 In
Japan Line, however, this does not entail the categorical exclusion of the
States from the realm of foreign affairs. Instead, the Court specifically
identifies a "national policy," which the state tax purportedly contravenes.
The Court notes that the Customs Convention on Containers, which was
signed by both the United States and Japan, evidences "the desirability of
uniform treatment of containers used exclusively in foreign commerce." 229 In addition to specifying that income derived from use of such
containers should not be taxed twice, the Convention provides that containers temporarily brought into a signatory country "are admitted free of
226. See 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
227. Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 286.
228. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452 (1979).
229. Id.
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'all duties and taxes whatsoever chargeable by reason of importation.' 2 '

3

0

This, in the Court's view demonstrated a "national policy to remove impediments to the use of containers as 'instruments of international traffic."' 23 1 And without holding that the Customs Convention on Containers
or any act of Congress had formally preempted California's law, and without holding that there was a specific conflict created by adherence to the
Convention and payment of California's tax, the Court decided that Cali2 2
fornia's tax "will frustrate the attainment of federal uniformity." 1
The threat that California's tax presents to uniformity is plain. Because Japan in fact did not tax American-owned containers located in Japan, California's tax created an "asymmetry" between the way containers
were treated in Japan and California. 233
_ : This non-uniformity on the international plane had obvious ramifications regarding the potential imposition of retaliatory taxes or other countermeasures. But far more
important, this (international, but not federal) lack of uniformity was in
tension with the national commitment to international uniformity (at least
among signatory states, which included Japan and the United States). In
this sense, California frustrated the ability of the Nation to "speak with one
voice" on the subject of taxing containers in international commerce, because it was in tension with the message that the United States had sent on
23 4
behalf of the Nation as a whole.
Such an enforcement of uniformity does not require the States to step
back entirely. It merely imposes an obligation upon the States to heed a
"national policy," even where that policy may not be expressed in a manner that would otherwise lead ordinary rules of preemption to prohibit the
state practice in question. This, then, is the crux of the holding in Japan
Line. First, the States are not entirely excluded from the foreign policy
230. Id. at 453.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. The Court also noted that other States may impose their own taxes and
thus contribute to a lack of uniformity in the method of taxation throughout the
United States, with the result that "foreign-owned containers will be subjected to
various degrees of multiple taxation, depending on which American ports they
enter." Id. The concern with this lack of uniformity may be twofold. On the one
hand, other States' taxation of foreign owned containers may further undermine
the Nation's purported message that it intends to create an international regime of
uniform treatment. This concern would simply be an extension of the concern
about California's tax itself. On the other hand, the Court may view the lack of
uniformity of taxation of foreign-owned containers to be itself a detriment to the
Nation as whole. In other words, the Court may claim that uniformity across the
Nation in the taxation of foreign commerce is itself a value. Given that the Court
does not hold that the federal government's power to tax foreign commerce invariably preempts non-uniform state taxes falling on this terrain, the decision is best
understood, as expressing only the first concern, i.e., that the potential existence of
similar (though not identical) taxes imposed by other States firther undermines
the "national policy" of uniform international treatment reflected in the Customs
Convention.
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realm by virtue of the federal government's action; second, they must,
however, not compromise the federal government's policy on the treatment of foreign commerce; and third, we can discern a national policy
even when it is only sketched out as a general principle that does not formally purport to stake out the field or otherwise preempt state
regulation .235
Although Barclays Bank is sometimes viewed as having reversed the
Court's position on state involvement in foreign commerce matters, the
departure from JapanLine is somewhat less radical than may appear at first
blush. If the Court's "one voice" jurisprudence is (mis)understood as being simply about creating uniformity across the United States in the taxation and regulation of foreign commerce, then Barclays Bank indeed
stands for a quite significant departure from prior case law. If, on the
other hand, the Court's "one voice" jurisprudence is understood as a doctrine of conformity of state actions with positive federal policy, then Barclays Bank reflects a far more modest departure, if it is a departure from
prior case law at all.
As an initial matter, the tax at issue in Barclays Bank appeared to be
both a common and fair approach to determining the portion of taxable
income reasonably attributable to California. 23 6 The Court did not require that California adhere to "international practice" in order to serve
international uniformity or the interests of foreign nations that may lack
access to the political process that created the tax. 2 37 The crucial question
for the Court was whether the tax frustrated uniformity "where federal
uniformity is essential" and whether it undermined the federal govern238
ment from "speaking with one voice."
Although some passages in Barclays Bank read as though the Court is
simply applying straightforward preemption rules and finding in this case
that Congress simply lacked the intent to preempt California's franchise
tax,239 the Court's decision is based on a different premise. Instead of
235. Cf Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 71 (1993) (upholding sales tax on lease of cargo containers, noting that "[t]he precise federal
policy regarding promotion of container use is satisfied by a proscription against
taxes that are imposed upon, or discriminate against, the importation of
containers").
236. As in Container Corp. v. FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983), the Court
was willing to sustain the tax despite the occurrence of multiple taxation because
other reasonable alternatives would result in a similar risk. Thus, the Court was
unwilling to require that California abandon its effort to tax the business simply
because any such effort might result in duplicative taxes collected elsewhere. As
noted above, see supra note 228 and accompanying text, this represents a modest
easing of the multiple taxation inquiry in Japan Line, although it still differs from
the corresponding inquiry under the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause.
237. See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 320 (1994).
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., id. at 321, 324 (finding, as in Container Corporation,no "'specific
indications of congressional intent' to bar the state action here.") (quoting
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196-97); id. at 331 ("we leave it to Congress . . . to
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finding a lack of preemption, the Court ultimately based its decision on
the view that Congress's inaction "implicitly ... permitted the States" to
use the reporting method at issue. 24°1 As the Court noted, Congress had
not enacted legislation in response to a prior, similar Court decision that
had upheld the California franchise tax. Furthermore, Congress was undoubtedly aware of foreign governments' concerns about the state tax.
And finally, the Senate had rejected one version of a treaty with the
United Kingdom that would have restricted state taxation in favor of another version of the treaty that did not. 24' The Court itself appeared to
realize that these actions fell far short of what would, in a different context, count as intentional authorization. 242 Again, however, it viewed the
matter through its magnifying lens of foreign policy analysis, noting that
an important premise underlying the decisions in this area of the law was
that "Congress may more passively indicate that certain state practices do
not 'impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.' 2 43 Put another way, the policy decision that emerged after the
States prodded Congress to consider the question was not to exclude the
States. And this policy decision, just as the one in Japan Line requiring
state conformity, could be discerned even absent formal legislation regarding the question of preemption.
VII.

Two

READINGS OF CROSBY

The Supreme Court's decision in Crosby is thus susceptible to two
readings, one suggesting strong federal exclusivity, and another signaling
openness to state participation in foreign affairs.
On the one hand, Crosby may signal a return to the unyielding, singular voice in foreign relations matters based on old-style mistrust of the
States. Several of Massachusetts' activities had not yet contravened federal
law. For example, as one strike against the state law, the Court notes that
Massachusetts' sanctions were permanent, whereas the federal measures
24 4
If
were subject to change during the bargaining process with Burma.
the States can be trusted, however, this conflict should be ripe only when
the federal government ends its sanctions and Massachusetts fails to follow
suit. Similarly, the Court notes that the permanence of the state measures
was in conflict with the President's power to end all sanctions whenever
the national security interest so demanded. Here, too, a more stateevaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state
autonomy").
240. Id. at 326.
241. Id. at 324-27.
242. Cf id. at 332 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that opinion "restores the power [over foreign commerce] to Congress-albeit in a form that strangely permits it to be exercised by silence").
243. Id. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448
(1979)).
244. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367 (2000).
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friendly approach might have deferred preemption until the State refused
to rescind its sanctions when the President canceled the corresponding
federal measures. With regard to these measures, one might complain
that the decision excluded the States prematurely and without awaiting
the federal articulation of a policy that the State was supposed to have
contravened.
Yet that was, of course, not the only basis for the Court's decision.
Taking the opinion as a whole, we may read the Court as carefully tracing
the articulation of federal policy embodied by the statutory scheme. As in
Hines, the decision struggles with the absence of any positive indication on
the part of Congress that the federal scheme, enacted with full knowledge
24 5
of the Massachusetts procurement law, intended to displace the States.
Yet the Court does not resort to the presumption against State involvement in foreign affairs. Instead the Court extracts from the entirety of the
statutory scheme that Congress intended to calibrate the overall force that
would be brought to bear on Burma by authorizing specific sanctions and
concentrating bargaining power in the President alone. This, then, was
the positive articulation of federal policy. It did not include any specific
expression regarding preemption, yet its purpose was in tension with continued state involvement. In that sense, Crosby appears to have rejected
any presumption against preemption, despite the opinion's protestations
to the contrary. And it was highly solicitous of preserving this positive federal policy, free from being compromised by the State.
In other words, by refraining from reaffirming Zschernig, the Court
remained open to the idea that Massachusetts may have been justified in
originally enacting the state Burma sanctions. And it may have remained
so in the absence of federal action. But three months after Massachusetts
brought the issue of sanctions against Burma onto the Nation's front
pages, the federal government articulated a comprehensive national policy on the matter. 2 4 6 To the extent that Massachusetts' continued pursuit
of its state sanctions would now be upheld despite the tensions with federal policy, it could only be upheld as a matter of state autonomy. But as
far as the national interest in state participation in foreign affairs was concerned, Massachusetts had already done its job.
245. Id. at 376, 387 (noting that it is "simply implausible" that Congress would
have "been willing" to allow States to compromise effectiveness of President's discretionary action); id. at 388 ("[T]he silence of Congress is ambiguous").
246. For a treatment of the reaction of the federal government to the enactment of the Massachusetts law, see State and Local Trade Sanctions Trouble U.S. Trade
Partners,WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at A20; see also Leon T. Hadar, U.S. Sanctions
Against Burma a Failure on All Fronts (Mar. 26, 1998), available at www.cato.org/
pubs/trade/tpa-001 .html (tracing history of U.S. sanctions against Burma from
state actions to Congress and Executive Branch). Whether the federal statute actually enacted was directly prompted by the Massachusetts law is somewhat unclear.
See Bradley, New American ForeignAffairs Law, supra note 1, at 1099; Swaine, Crosby
as Foreign Relations Law, supra note 1, at 484. n.10.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001

53

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2001], Art. 4
1068

VILIANovA LAW REVIEW

VIII.

[Vol. 46: p. 1015

CONCLUSION

The Court has repeatedly invoked the principle that "[i]n international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and
adequate national power."2 47 As this Article has sought to demonstrate,
this is not an accurate picture of federalism (or the lack thereof) in foreign affairs. Although the federal government may have the full complement of formal powers to act within the foreign affairs arena, it more than
occasionally needs help in taking action and formulating federal policy.
This help has increasingly come through state participation in matters affecting our foreign relations. State participation in foreign affairs may
help counteract resource limitations at the federal level, provide expertise
on foreign policy matters with significant local implications, mediate
among competing interest groups and broaden political support for national initiatives, and spur the federal government into action. In cases of
tension between federal and state policies, the latter benefit is particularly
significant, and has accordingly been the primary focus of analysis here.
Thus, quite apart from any purported autonomy interest of the States,
and apart from the usual consideration of the evils of state activities in
foreign affairs, this Article has urged a different focus: the consideration
of state participation as beneficial to the interests of the Nation as a whole.
If one is concerned with national power and filled with utter distrust of the
States, as the Court has been in early times, then a broad rule of dormant
exclusion neatly follows. If one is solely concerned with state autonomy,
then the point of displacing the States would naturally lie only at the point
of affirmative formal preemption. But if, as this Article has suggested, we
evaluate state participation with a view to its positive contribution to the
national interest, a slightly different approach emerges. States should not
be excluded from the foreign policy arena, but in stepping into that
realm, States must not discriminate against their sister States, and they
must heed national policy once articulated by the federal political
branches. Thus, state participation is indeed beneficial, but only up to a
point. That point is reached when the Nation has spoken to the issues
raised and has chosen to exclude the States. According to the Court, that
point had been reached in Crosby.

247. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933).
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